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I. ROBINSON’S RELEVANCE 
In the World War I era, two justices on the North Dakota Supreme 
Court competed as judicial candidates, clashed as colleagues, and openly 
criticized each other’s conduct.1  The clashes between Justice Bruce and 
 
 *J.D. with distinction, University of Michigan Law School, 1953; law clerk, U.S. District 
Judge Charles J. Vogel, Fargo, N.D., 1953-54; practitioner, Pringle & Herigstad law firm, Minot, 
N.D., 1954-85; Justice (now retired), North Dakota Supreme Court, 1985-98; Of Counsel to 
Pringle & Herigstad, P.C. Minot, N.D., 1999 to present. 
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Justice Robinson uncovered widely divergent judicial values.2  Many of 
those values remain relevant for today’s standards of judicial conduct. 
Justice James E. Robinson served on the North Dakota Supreme Court 
from January 1917 through December 1922.3  Elected in a very partisan 
judicial election, he was probably the most colorful and eccentric figure in 
the history of the Court, but he should be remembered more for his fervent 
efforts to reform the judicial system.4 
Justice Andrew A. Bruce served on the Court from October 1911 to 
December 1918.5 
Robinson doggedly criticized Bruce’s poor performance as Chief 
Justice during their two years together on the Court.6  Robinson advocated 
shorter opinions, better procedures, and more deference to a trial court’s 
discretion in most cases.7  Bruce accused Robinson of improper judicial 
speech and disparaged his opinion writing.8  Bruce became an arch and 
bitter critic of Robinson.  Their clashes over judicial values brought nation-
al notoriety to Robinson and the North Dakota Supreme Court. 
We sketched some of Robinson’s story in our previous law review 
article, The North Dakota Supreme Court: A Century of Advances.9  Since 
then, we have located more materials about his conflicts with Bruce, and 
their differing judicial values.  In this article, we develop a more detailed 
account of their conflicts with an eye to their relevancy for current stan-
dards of judicial conduct. 
Long established standards of judicial conduct are changing since the 
major 2002 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Republican 
Party of Minnesota v. White.10 That decision invalidated judicial standards 
 
 **J.D. with distinction, University of North Dakota School of Law, 1986; Director, Attorney 
Services, University of North Dakota Thormodsgard Law Library, 1987-95; M.I.L.S., University 
of Michigan, 2005; Law Librarian, Supreme Court, 1995 to present. 
1. See discussion infra Parts IV, V (detailing Robinson’s election). 
2. See discussion infra Parts IV, V. 
3. Hon. Herbert L. Meschke & Ted Smith, The North Dakota Supreme Court: A Century of 
Advances, 76 N.D. L. REV. 217, 307 (App. A) (2000). 
4. See discussion infra Part X (discussing judicial vices, virtues, and values). 
5. Meschke & Smith, supra note 3, at 307. 
6. See discussion infra Part V (discussing Robinson’s court). 
7. See discussion infra Part V (delivering information on Robinson’s court). 
8. See discussion infra Part V.H, VI.A (discussing Bruce’s Counterattack and Central Law 
Journal: Bruce’s Attack respectively). 
9. Meschke & Smith, supra note 3, at 242-47.  See also A Century of Advances: The NPL’s 
Justice Robinson, http://www.ndcourts.com/court/history/century/II.F.htm (last visited May 7, 
2006). 
10. 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
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constraining campaign speech by candidates for election to judicial 
offices.11 
In White, the five-member majority ruled that the First Amendment 
prevented the Minnesota Supreme Court from prohibiting candidates for 
judicial election from announcing their views on disputed legal subjects.12  
In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia carefully said, “we express no view” 
on the parallel “so-called ‘pledges or promises’ clause which separately 
prohibits judicial candidates from making ‘pledges or promises of conduct 
in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of 
the office.’”13 
Yet, the separate opinions in White plainly anticipate that prohibitions 
of “pledges or promises” will be strictly scrutinized under the First 
Amendment, too. 
Thus, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence expressed misgivings about 
electing judges instead of appointing them.14  She declared Minnesota had 
“voluntarily taken on the risks [of] judicial bias” by choosing to elect 
judges.15  “As a result,” she cautioned, “[Minnesota’s] claim that it needs to 
significantly restrict judges’ speech in order to protect judicial impartiality 
is particularly troubling.”16  In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy expressed 
a similar view: “The State cannot opt for an elected judiciary and then 
assert that its democracy, in order to work as desired, compels the abridge-
ment of speech.”17 
Minority opinions by Justices Ginsburg and Stevens, each joined by all 
four dissenters, explained their understanding of the effect of the White-
majority decision.  Justice Stevens said “ . . . the reasoning [of] the Court’s 
opinion . . . create[s] the false impression that the standards for the election 
of political candidates apply equally to candidates for judicial office.”18  
Indeed, the majority clearly gives that impression, but whether the impres-
sion is false or not remains to be decided. 
Justice Ginsburg described the effect of the majority opinion: 
Uncoupled from the Announce Clause, the ban on pledges or 
promises is easily circumvented.  By prefacing a campaign com-
mitment with the caveat, ‘although I cannot promise anything,’ or 
 
11. White, 536 U.S. at 765. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 770. 
14. Id. at 792. 
15. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 795 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
18. Id. at 802 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
       
28 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 82:25 
by simply avoiding the language of promises or pledges altogether, 
a candidate could declare with impunity how she would decide 
specific issues.19 
We think the history of North Dakota’s 1916 election of Justice 
Robinson, when no written standards of conduct circumscribed campaign 
speech by a judicial candidate, confirms the doubts of the dissenters.20  
Bruce complained particularly about Robinson’s announced views and 
pledges during his 1916 election campaign.21  North Dakota’s experience 
with Justice Robinson thus prefigured post-White campaigns for judicial 
office. 
In this article, we trace Bruce’s and Robinson’s rise to the Court, 
sketch their election campaigns, and chronicle their conflicts.  We review 
the publications of that time about their judicial attitudes, conduct, and 
values. These include Robinson’s published weekly accounts, several key 
judicial opinions, five law review pieces, and a book that each wrote.  
Altogether, this public conflict brought Bruce and Robinson—as well as the 
North Dakota Supreme Court—much national attention.  We also note 
recent legal articles that continue to echo some of Robinson’s ideas.  
Overall, we endeavor to explain the modern relevance of the judicial vices, 
virtues, and values observable in North Dakota’s experience with Justice 
Robinson. 
II. ROBINSON’S BACKGROUND 
James E. Robinson was born in Michigan in 184322 and reared there.23  
He served as a soldier for the Union in the Civil War.24  He was graduated 
 
19. Id. at 819.  In her footnote 5, Ginsburg added: 
In the absence of the Announce Clause, other components of the Minnesota Code of 
Judicial Conduct designed to maintain the nonpartisan character of the State’s judicial 
elections would similarly unravel.  A candidate would have no need to “attend politi-
cal gatherings” or “make speeches on behalf  of a political organization,” for she could 
simply state her views elsewhere, counting on her supporters to carry those views to 
the party faithful.  And although candidates would remain barred from “seek[ing], 
accept[ing], or us[ing] endorsements from a political organization,” parties might well 
provide such endorsements unsolicited upon hearing candidates’ views on specific 
issues. . . .  Those unsolicited endorsements, in turn, would render ineffective the 
prohibition against candidates “identify[ing] themselves as members of a political 
organization.” 
Id. at 820 n.5 (citations omitted) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
20. See discussion infra Part IV (describing and discussing Robinson’s election). 
21. See discussion infra Part V.H. (discussing Bruce’s Counterattack). 
22. James E. Robinson, Former Member of High Court, Is Dead, BISMARCK TRIB., Mar. 23, 
1933, at 1.  His obituary and memorials gave Michigan as his birthplace.  See, e.g., id.  However, 
other sources indicate his birthplace as Canada. 1870 Census for Trempealeau, Wis., 1870 U.S. 
Federal Census, Reel M593-1737, Page 263, Image 526; 1880 Census for Winona, Minn., 10th 
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from the University of Michigan in 1868 with a Bachelor of Laws.25  He 
was admitted to the practice of law in Wisconsin, and served as district 
attorney of Trempealeau County, in Whitehall, Wisconsin, for several 
years.26  Whitehall is just north of Lacrosse, Wisconsin, and just across the 
Mississippi River from Winona, Minnesota.  Robinson lived and practiced 
at Winona, Minnesota, for some time.27 
Robinson moved west to Fargo in Dakota Territory in the early 1880s.  
He obtained homestead patents in 1894 and 1895 for land near Stratford, 
South Dakota.28  After homesteading, he divided his time between prac-
ticing law in Fargo and farming at Stratford.29 
He was admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of Dakota 
Territory on May 16, 1884.30  Robinson, or his firm, participated in two 
cases before the Dakota Territorial Supreme Court and in sixty-four cases 
 
Census 1880, Minnesota, Reel 638, Page 267A; 1885 Fargo, Dakota Territory Census, 
http://dp3.lib.ndsu.nodak.edu/cgi-bin/1885Census/family.pl?page=22-036-17. 
23. James E. Robinson, Former Member of High Court, Is Dead, BISMARCK TRIB., Mar. 23, 
1933, at 1. 
24. Robinson served in Company B of the 39th Wisconsin Infantry.  32 WIS. NECROLOGY 
148 (1933) (containing a clipping of Robinson’s obituary from the Milwaukee Journal, dated Mar. 
23, 1933, among other obituaries from Wisconsin newspapers contained within the scrapbook).  
The 39th Wisconsin Infantry was organized for 100 days of service and assisted in the defense of 
Memphis, Tennessee in August 1864.  Wisc. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, http://museum. 
dva.state.wi.us/Res_regiments.asp (last visited June 8, 2006).  Robinson enlisted May 28, 1864, 
and mustered out September 22, 1864.  2 ROSTER OF WISCONSIN VOLUNTEERS: WAR OF THE 
REBELLION 1861-1865 660 (Democrat Printing Co. 1886). 
 Robinson wrote little about his Civil War experience, even though he wrote extensively on 
many subjects.  His only reference to the Civil War that we have found was this fragment in an 
editorial he wrote condemning conscription for military service in World War I: 
Even in our day and generation, poor white soldiers were tied to posts and flogged on 
the bare back with a rawhide by order of snobbish, well-paid officers.  And it would 
not be far amiss to say that they were flogged because of being poor and ill-paid.  If 
the soldiers had received a man’s pay of $100 a month, then there would have been no 
flogging and no Bull’s Run. 
Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., May 26, 1917, at 4.  In Robinson’s view, conscription 
was an unconstitutional taking of a person’s right to the fruits of his labor.  Id. 
25. James E. Robinson, Former Member of High Court, Is Dead, BISMARCK TRIB., Mar. 23, 
1933, at 1. The University of Michigan Law School, Alumni Directory 2002 (listing “Robinson, 
James E.” in the class of 1868). 
26. Id. 
27. See 1880 Census for Winona, Minn., supra note 22 (listing Robinson’s family and his 
occupation as an attorney). 
28. See Homesteader of Stratford Dies:  James E. Robinson, North Dakota Politician and 
Jurist, Passes Away, ABERDEEN EVENING NEWS, Mar. 24, 1933, at 1. 
29. Even after Robinson went on the North Dakota Supreme Court, he sometimes mentioned 
“going to look after my good grain, stock and pig farm” in South Dakota. Saturday Evening 
Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., May 5, 1919, at 3.  “Farming is my hobby,” he said.  Id. 
30. DAKOTA TERRITORIAL S. CT. J., 741 (June Term, 1862-February Term, 1885). 
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before the North Dakota Supreme Court.31  Early in his Dakota Territorial 
practice, he was charged with subornation to perjury and subsequently won 
a dismissal on demurrer; the Territorial Supreme Court affirmed the dis-
missal.32  In Fargo, Robinson gained a reputation as a “title attorney.”33  
According to records in the Cass County Recorder’s office, he acted as 
trustee of lots in Fargo from 1898 to 1910, likely a form of investment trust 
in use at the time.34 
Robinson’s wife’s name was Isabella.35  On his death in 1933, he left a 
son, Arthur Robinson, of Jamestown, North Dakota, and two daughters, 
Mrs. Jessie R. Broom, of Stratford, South Dakota, and Angie Blair, of 
Groton, South Dakota.36  Apparently, another daughter, Lillie, predeceased 
him.37 
Robinson often exhibited eccentric behavior.  “While practicing law in 
Fargo, he is said to have gone bare-headed and bare-foot in the winter time 
on many occasions.”38  Robinson believed that “the best way to keep well 
was to have the flesh in contact with the soil, so he went about the streets 
barefooted.”39 
 
31. Search of West’s North Dakota Reporter CD-Rom Cases database (using search strategy: 
attorney(robinson) & date(<1918)) (on file with the author).  One of the cases before the 
Territorial Court was the appeal of his acquittal for subornation of perjury.  United States v. 
Robinson, 23 N.W. 90 (1885).  Of the 64 cases before the North Dakota Supreme Court, he is 
listed as the sole counsel for one of the parties in 41 of the cases, Robinson and William Lemke as 
counsel for 8 of the cases, and the balance named either Robinson’s firm without designating the 
primary attorney or else named Robinson and others as joint counsel. 
32. United States v. Robinson, 23 N.W. 90, 91 (1885).  The actions complained of took place 
in January 1883 in Fargo.  Id.  Robinson was indicted by a grand jury in February 1884 for in-
ducing another to lie, under oath, in a homestead proceeding.  Id.  He demurred for the reason that 
the facts did not constitute a public offense.  Id.  The trial court sustained the demurrer and the 
Supreme Court affirmed.  See United States v. Robinson, (No. 160) Roll 8, Dakota Territorial S. 
Ct., Microfilm Edition of The Dakota Territorial Records (available at the Orin G. Libby 
Manuscript Collection, Department of Special Collections, Chester Fritz Library, University of 
North Dakota). 
33. James E. Robinson, Former Member of High Court, Is Dead, BISMARCK TRIB., Mar. 23, 
1933, at 1. 
34. See 7 DEEDS 511; 68 DEEDS 426; 81 DEEDS 188; and 99 DEEDS 608 (available at the 
Cass County Recorder’s Office in Fargo, North Dakota). 
35. See 1880 Census for Winona, Minn., supra note 22. 
36. James E. Robinson, Former Member of High Court, Is Dead, BISMARCK TRIB., Mar. 23, 
1933, at 1 (naming only one daughter, Jessie R. Brown); Homesteader of Stratford Dies:  James 
E. Robinson, North Dakota Politician and Jurist, Passes Away, ABERDEEN EVENING NEWS, Mar. 
24, l933, at 1 (naming two daughters, Jessie Broom and Angie Blair). 
37. See 1885 Fargo, Dakota Territory Census, supra note 22 (listing Lillie as a daughter).  
But see James E. Robinson, Former Member of High Court, Is Dead, BISMARCK TRIB., Mar. 23, 
1933, at 1 (failing to identify Lillie as surviving Robinson). 
38. James E. Robinson, Former Member of High Court, Is Dead, BISMARCK TRIB., Mar. 23, 
1933, at 1. 
39. JAMES E. ROBINSON, WRONGS AND REMEDIES: ECONOMIC LIVE WIRE ESSAYS 283-84 
(Knickerbocker Press 1923) (republishing an excerpt of an undated article attributed to the New 
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Robinson and William Lemke practiced law together in Fargo, 
beginning about 1906.40  Lemke became “one of the inner circle of [Non-
Partisan] League leaders.”41  Later, their association contributed to Robin-
son’s election to the Supreme Court as the League flourished politically. 
Robinson became a capable campaigner for public office.  He sought 
the nomination for Congress in the 1908 primary as a Republican.42  He ran 
“on a radical platform, proposing the most progressive revision of estab-
lished legal forms and practices. . . .”43  Robinson campaigned with a 
cowbell.  When he came to a convenient place, he rolled out a barrel, 
climbed on it, and swung his cowbell until he gathered a curious crowd to 
listen.44  Robinson lost in the 1908 primary when he ran sixth in a field of 
nine candidates for congress, capturing only five percent of the Republican 
ballots.45 
Robinson first sought election to the Supreme Court in 1912.  His only 
opponent was Bruce.  
III. ROBINSON’S ADVERSARY 
Andrew Alexander Bruce led a storied life to the North Dakota 
Supreme Court. 
Bruce was born April 15, 1866, of Scotch parents with the British 
military service at the mountain fort of Nunda Drug near Madras in India.46  
His father, Edward Archibald Bruce, was a British general; his mother, 
 
York Times).  Robinson also opposed vaccinations for immunizations. “In the early days of Fargo 
my children were excluded from the public schools because I would not allow them to be 
vaccinated, there being no real or apparent necessity for vaccination.”  Saturday Evening Letter, 
BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 3, 1917, at 4. 
40. Lemke came to Fargo in 1906, and Robinson and Lemke are listed as partners in the 
1907 Fargo City Directory.  1907 FARGO AND MOORHEAD DIRECTORY 190 (Pettibone Directory 
Co. 1907). 
41. See ROBERT L. MORLAN, POLITICAL PRAIRIE FIRE: THE NONPARTISAN LEAGUE 1915-
1922 52-53 (1983) (recounting the ascent of the Non-Partisan League between 1915 and 1922 as a 
political force in North Dakota). 
42. TIM EIKEN, JODI LARSON, & LLOYD OMDAHL, NORTH DAKOTA VOTES 128 (Lloyd 
Omdahl, Tim Gelinske, & Bruce Grindy eds., 1993). 
43. ROBINSON, supra note 39, at 279 (republishing an excerpt of an article from Country 
Gentleman dated May 5, 1917). 
44. Id. at 279-80.  In his own book, Bruce remarked on Robinson’s unsuccessful 1908 cam-
paign “in which he adopted the peculiar practice of collecting his audiences by ringing a cow-bell 
while standing at street corners, on railroad platforms, and on the top of freight cars.”  ANDREW 
A. BRUCE, NON-PARTISAN LEAGUE 68 (Richard T. Ely ed.,  The MacMillan Co. 1921). 
45. NORTH DAKOTA VOTES, supra note 42, at 128. 
46. PROCEEDINGS OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION OF NORTH DAKOTA FOR THE YEAR 1911, at 3-
4 (1911) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS 1911] (offering a biographical sketch of Andrew Alexander 
Bruce, President of the State Bar Association, 1910-1911); Memoriam for Hon. Andrew A. Bruce, 
in 12 BAR BRIEFS OF STATE BAR ASS’N OF N.D. 166 (1935) [hereinafter 1935 Memoriam]. 
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Anne Young McMaster, was the daughter of a colonel.47  His parents sent 
Bruce to Europe to be educated, but both parents died when he was 
young.48  This orphaned teen-ager immigrated to the United States in 
1881.49  After landing in New York City, alone, destitute, and friendless, 
Bruce made his way to Minnesota.50  There, in the Winona area, he worked 
as a farm laborer and as a bookkeeper.51  In 1886, Bruce entered the 
University of Wisconsin and worked his way through.  He did manual labor 
and stenography, and he wrote for newspapers.52  He completed both aca-
demic and law degrees at the University of Wisconsin.53 
Bruce worked two years as secretary to the judges of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court while attending law school.54  In 1892, he became chief 
clerk of the law department of the Illinois Central Railway.55  He later be-
came attorney for the Illinois board of factory inspectors and practiced law 
in Chicago.56  In 1898, Bruce became a law professor at the University of 
Wisconsin.57 
He married Elizabeth Pickett, a native of Kentucky, in June 1899.58  By 
1911, they had two children: a daughter, Glenna Bruce, and a son, Edward 
McMaster Bruce.59 
Bruce left his Wisconsin law position in 1902 for a similar one at the 
University of North Dakota, and soon became dean of that law school.60  In 
1911, Governor John Burke appointed Bruce to the North Dakota Supreme 
Court to fill the vacancy left by the resignation of Chief Justice Morgan.61 
At the time, Bruce served as President of the State Bar Association.62  
A Bar publication acclaimed his qualifications: 
 
47. PROCEEDINGS 1911, supra note 46, at 3-4. 
48. Id.; see also Andrew Alexander Bruce, Candidate to Succeed Himself as Justice of 
Supreme Court, in N.D. STATE PUBLICITY PAMPHLET 44 (Devils Lake Journal 1912) (edited and 
compiled under authority of law, P.D. Norton, Secretary of State, Bismarck, North Dakota) 
(providing statements of candidates for the primary election on June 26, 1912). 
49. PROCEEDINGS 1911, supra note 46, at 3-4. 
50. Id. (providing that at first he was without money and without friends and worked as a 
farm laborer in Minnesota.) 
51. Id.  No record suggests Bruce and Robinson knew each other while both lived in the 
Winona area.  Robinson lived in that vicinity from about 1868 to 1885. 
52. PROCEEDINGS 1911, supra note 46, at 3. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. 1935 Memoriam, supra note 46, at 166. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. PROCEEDINGS 1911, supra note 46, at 4. 
59. Id.; 1935 Memoriam, supra note 46, at 166. 
60. 1935 Memoriam, supra note 46, at 166. 
61. PROCEEDINGS 1911, supra note 46, at 3. 
62. Id. at 4. 
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He has written extensively for the legal magazines and encyclo-
pedias and has done much work on the lecture platform. He has 
been on some of the more important committees of the American 
Bar Association, and was a delegate from that association to the 
World’s Congress of Jurists and Lawyers. He was chairman of the 
committee on Organization of the Judicial Section of the American 
Bar Association, and has read several papers before the associa-
tion.  He has been . . . an associate editor of the Central Law 
Journal, and a member of the National Commission on Uniform 
State Laws.63 
Later, Bruce used his editorial connection to the Central Law Journal to air 
his differences with Robinson in a national forum.64 
When Bruce sought election to a full six-year term on the Court in 
1912, Robinson opposed him.65  The 1912 election contest opened a rivalry 
between Bruce and Robinson that lasted a decade.66 
 
63. Id. at 3-4.  Bruce served on the following A.B.A. Committees: 
-Special Committee on Classification of the Law, 1905-07. 1905 A.B.A. ANN. 
MEETING REP. 198; 1906 A.B.A. ANN. MEETING REP. 170; 1907 A.B.A. ANN. 
MEETING REP. 192. 
-Uniform State Laws Committee, 1908-09, 1913-18. 1908 A.B.A. ANN. MEETING 
REP. 171; 1909 A.B.A. ANN. MEETING REP. 171; 1913 A.B.A. ANN. MEETING REP. 
167; 1914 A.B.A. ANN. MEETING REP. 160; 1915 A.B.A. ANN. MEETING REP. 127; 
1916 A.B.A. ANN. MEETING REP. 150; 1917 A.B.A. ANN. MEETING REP. 190; 1918 
A.B.A. ANN. MEETING REP. 200. 
-Grievances Committee, 1917-18. 1917 A.B.A. ANN. MEETING REP. 188; 1918 
A.B.A. ANN. MEETING REP. 199. 
-Special Committee on Co-operation Among Bar Associations, 1919. 1919 A.B.A. 
ANN. MEETING REP. 146. 
-Legal Aid Committee, 1921. 1921 A.B.A. ANN. MEETING REP. 159. 
-Special Committee American Citizenship, 1922. 1922 A.B.A. ANN. MEETING REP. 
160. 
-Committee on Noteworthy Changes in Statute Law, 1923-26. 1923 A.B.A. ANN. 
MEETING REP. 187; 1924 A.B.A. ANN. MEETING REP. 23; 1925 A.B.A. ANN. 
MEETING REP. 24; 1926 A.B.A. ANN. MEETING REP. 26. 
Bruce read the following papers to sections of the A.B.A. at its Annual Meetings: 
-The Relation of the Bar Examiner to the Law School and Legal Education, to the 
Legal Education Section, 1908. 1908 A.B.A. ANN. MEETING REP. 828. 
-The Function of the Bar Examiner, to the Legal Education Section, 1911. 1911 
A.B.A. ANN. MEETING REP. 689. 
-A Government by Men and Not by Law, 1918. 1918 A.B.A. ANN. MEETING REP. 495. 
-Interest of the Public in Legal Education, to the Legal Education Section, 1920. 1920 
A.B.A. ANN. MEETING REP. 480.  
64. See discussion infra Part VI.A. (discussing Central Law Journal: Bruce’s Attack). 
65. BRUCE, supra note 44, at 68. 
66. Id. 
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According to Bruce, Robinson campaigned in 1912 “on a platform in 
which he promised many fantastic legal reforms; and in which he de-
nounced the lawyers and judges of the past as the tools of big interests and 
the servants of corruption.”67 
Robinson did indeed endorse extensive changes in judicial adminis-
tration: 
[T]he law is still in its dark ages and some of its doctors still 
“grope as if they had no eyes and stumble at noon day as in the 
night.”  The judges have time and opportunity to note the defects 
of the law and to draft and secure the passage of measures to 
remedy every defect.  They have power to make rules of court, and 
to put an end to all of the delays, grafts and technicalities which 
continue to be a reproach to the law.  They have power to get out 
of the old ruts of the law and to deal out remedial justice in a plain, 
common sense and businesslike manner.  This they have never 
done.  On the contrary, they keep in the old ruts of the law and 
permit an old technical procedure to blind their eyes and to shut 
out the light of truth, and often to make a mockery of justice.  
Hence it is that they may take months or years to decide a simple 
case erroneously which should be decided correctly in a day.68 
Robinson caustically deplored the outlandish expense of printed 
records for simple cases; “it is quite an easy matter to refer to the original 
record.”69  He characterized holding only two terms of court each year as “a 
relic of judicial barbarism.”70  Anticipating his later attitude on the Court, 
Robinson emphasized: “There is no honesty in drawing a salary for the 
doing of work which is left undone.”71 
Robinson also promised, “if elected, to give an account of his 
work . . . .”72  As we will see, he kept this promise. 
According to Bruce, Robinson’s 1912 “campaign was managed by his 
law partner William Lemke, [who became a leader in the Non-Partisan 
League in 1916], and though it was unsuccessful, it served both to bring 
 
67. Id. 
68. James E. Robinson, Candidate for Nomination as Justice of Supreme Court, in N.D. 
PUBLICITY PAMPHLET 46 (Devils Lake Journal 1912) (edited and compiled under authority of law 
by P.D. Norton, Sec’y of State, Bismarck, North Dakota) (providing Robinson’s candidate 
statement for primary election on June 26, 1912). 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 47. 
72. Id. 
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Robinson’s name before the people, and as a training school in political 
methods for his astute manager.”73 
Bruce defeated Robinson in the 1912 primary for this Supreme Court 
seat, 36,128 votes to 30,341, and routed him in the general election, 43,989 
to 28,901.74 
Robinson had an eccentric personality, an energetic temperament, and 
a dignified appearance.75  He was a large man with an erect carriage and a 
full, flowing white beard;76 he “looked like an Old Testament Prophet.”77  In 
1916, at age seventy-three, Robinson ran again for the Supreme Court. 
IV. ROBINSON’S ELECTION 
Robinson’s 1916 campaign for a Supreme Court position was much 
different than his 1912 campaign.  Several big changes in judicial elections 
combined with a strong shift in political currents to make the 1916 
campaign dramatic and extraordinary. 
Three justices stood for re-election at the same time.  This happened 
because in 1908, the people had approved a constitutional amendment to 
expand the Court from three to five members,78 but defeated a companion 
proposal to increase a justice’s term of office from six years with three 
staggered terms to ten years with five staggered terms.79  In 1909, the 
Governor had appointed two justices to fill the new positions.80  However, 
in 1910, two district judges, Edward T. Burke of Valley City and Evan B. 
Goss of Minot, defeated those appointees and won six-year terms, along 
with Charles J. Fisk, an incumbent who was re-elected.81  All three sought 
re-election in 1916.82 
 
73. BRUCE, supra note 44, at 68. 
74. NORTH DAKOTA VOTES, supra note 42, at 89. 
75. In an introduction published with one of Robinson’s Letters, The Bismarck Tribune once 
described Robinson as “a character compelling attention.”  Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK 
TRIB., Dec. 22, 1917, at 4. 
76. Meschke & Smith, supra note 3, at 245 (quoting former Clerk of the North Dakota 
Supreme Court, J. Henry Newton, Lecture No. 1 at the University of North Dakota School of Law, 
at 2 (1950) (lecture notes available at the North Dakota Supreme Court Law Library)). 
77. Hon. Robert Vogel, Justice Robinson and the Supreme Court of North Dakota, 58 N.D. 
L. REV. 83, 84 (1982). 
78. See N.D. CONST.  of 1889 art. IV, § 89 (repealed 1976); 1907 N.D. Laws 410-11. 
79. See I COLONEL CLEMENT A. LOUNSBERRY, NORTH DAKOTA HISTORY AND PEOPLE 447 
(1917).  Later, in 1930, the people approved a constitutional amendment for ten-year staggered 
terms.  1931 N.D. Laws 578, art. 46. 
80. Meschke & Smith, supra note 3, at 241, 307. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 242-43. 
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Another big change was the No-Party ballot for all judges, which was 
enacted in 1909 and first used in the 1910 election of judges.83  This law 
only prohibited references to party affiliation in the petition nominating a 
judge, and it prescribed a separate “Judiciary Ballot” to list candidates with-
out any political affiliation shown.84 
No law, however, prevented political parties from endorsing judicial 
candidates. No statute or rule prohibited judicial candidates from 
announcing their political affiliations publicly.  Indeed, during the 1916 
campaign, one newspaper identified Justice Goss as a Republican and 
Justice Fisk as a Democrat, even though they had been elected on a no-
party ballot in 1910.85  Ironically, despite the efforts to separate politics 
from judicial elections, the 1916 campaign for the Supreme Court became 
the most partisan one in North Dakota’s history. 
The March 1916 convention of the Non-Partisan League endorsed 
candidates for all state offices, including the three Supreme Court posi-
tions.86  The League endorsed: 
Luther Birdzell, professor in the law school of the state university 
and a former member of the State Tax Commission, known to be a 
“single-taxer”; Richard H. Grace, a lawyer of Mohall having 
Socialist inclinations, [He was later to become a stanch Harding 
man.] and James E. Robinson, Fargo law partner of William 
Lemke, a League attorney and one of the inner circle of League 
leaders.  Robinson was an elderly gentleman with a flowing gray 
beard, known to be rather eccentric, though prominent as a 
crusader for judicial reforms.87 
The North Dakota State Publicity Pamphlet for the June 28, 1916 
primary election contained statements from seven candidates for the three 
Supreme Court positions.88   
Among those seeking re-election, Edward T. Burke carefully distanced 
himself from any political endorsement: “It is my wish to owe my election 
to the voters themselves and not to any group of politicians.”89  C.J. Fisk 
 
83. Id. at 240. 
84. 1909 N.D. Laws 82, ch. 82. 
85. Meschke & Smith, supra note 3, at 242 n.160. 
86. Id. at 242. 
87. MORLAN, supra note 41, at 52-53 (chronicling the ascent of the Non-Partisan League 
between 1915 and 1922 as a strong political force in the state). 
88. See, e.g., N.D. STATE PUBLICITY PAMPHLET 13-20 (Globe-Gazette Printing Co. 1916) 
(edited and compiled under authority of law by Thomas Hall, Sec’y of State, Bismarck, North 
Dakota) (providing statements of the candidates for the primary election on June 28, 1916).   
89. Id. at 14. 
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emphasized his ten years of experience as a trial judge and his ten years on 
the Supreme Court.90  E.B. Goss insisted he had “industriously endeavored 
to assist this court to get abreast and kept up with its work.  And for the first 
time in many years this Court is deciding cases soon after they reach here, 
to the satisfaction of the bar, the litigants and the people generally.”91  Keep 
this singular assertion in mind! 
Among the League’s candidates, L.E. Birdzell emphasized his expe-
rience as a law professor and as chairman of the “first State Tax Commis-
sion,” but declared, “it is both impossible and inexpedient that I should 
make a campaign, canvass the voters or solicit votes, however much I may 
desire to do so.”92  R.H. Grace’s statement made him out to be a reformer 
like Robinson: 
I shall advocate certain judicial reforms, among them being deci-
sions, which shall be clear and more concise; decisions which are 
concise and clear are of more service to the Bench and Bar and 
also more easily understood by the public, than are lengthily 
written decisions. 
Another much desired reform is to avoid the technicalities of law 
and procedure; rules of court can be so amended as to render much 
assistance along this line, as well as legislation may be procured to 
that end by the bench and bar properly presenting such needs to 
the legislature.93 
Robinson published two pages in the Publicity Pamphlet without a 
picture of himself, unlike the other judicial candidates who each put a 
picture in his publicity statement.94  He pledged “[t]o draft and secure Court 
Rules and Laws to remedy the wrongs of the legal procedure; To write 
decisions concise and just, in accordance with law and reason; to show how 
to reduce the tax burdens in each year at least several hundred thousand 
dollars.”95  Robinson complained about judges: 
They seem to think that their duty is merely to dole out legal 
remedies and to draw their salary.  Hence it is that the legal proce-
dure is still in its Dark Ages, and some Law Doctors still grope as 
if they had no eyes, and stumble at noon-day as in the night. . . .  
They have power to get out of the old ruts of the law and to deal 
 
90. Id. at 15. 
91. Id. at 16. 
92. Id. at 13. 
93. Id. at 17. 
94. Id. at 18-19. 
95. Id. at 18. 
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out remedial justice in a plain, common-sense, courteous and 
business-like manner.  This they have never done.96 
He summarized a number of unjust applications of procedure and de-
claimed: “The Court rules and rulings, do ever impose needless burdens, 
delays and complications.”97 
Robinson concluded his publicity statement, declaring that “[t]he 
Supreme Court judges have power to make the crooked ways straight, and 
to establish in judicial procedure a new and just era.  They have power to 
make the procedure a beacon to lighten the darkness of jurisprudence.”98 
None of the judicial candidates’ publicity statements mentioned a party 
affiliation or endorsement, except one, Burleigh F. Spaulding, who said, 
“Although a Republican, I was appointed to the Supreme Court by 
Governor John Burke in February, 1907, and . . . served until January, 
1915.”99  But Robinson cleverly included the separate word “Non-Partisan” 
in the heading of his statement, unlike any of the other candidates.100  Since 
citizens received a “Non-Partisan Ballot” to vote for judges, Robinson 
apparently got away with an evident double meaning that connected him to 
the Non-Partisan League. 
Heated public debates on disputed legal subjects have often affected 
judicial elections.  A controversial decision by the North Dakota Supreme 
Court in early September influenced the 1916 election.  The case arose after 
the people had approved a legislative proposal101 in the 1914 general elec-
tion, amending the constitution to authorize constitutional amendments by 
popular initiative.102  Following that authorization, an initiated petition was 
filed in 1916 with the Secretary of State to amend the constitution to 
relocate the state capitol from Bismarck to New Rockford.103 
Several taxpayers sought an original writ in the Supreme Court to 
enjoin the Secretary of State from submitting it to the voters.104  The 
taxpayers mainly argued that the constitutional amendment for initiated 
 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 19. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 20.  Governor Burke was a Democrat who later became a Supreme Court justice.  
See Meschke & Smith, supra note 3, at 241. 
100. James E. Robinson, Candidate for Judge of the Supreme Court, in N.D. PUBLICITY 
PAMPHLET 18 (Globe-Gazette Printing Co. 1916) (edited and compiled under authority of law by 
Thomas Hall, Sec’y of State, Bismarck, North Dakota). 
101. 1911 N.D. Laws 163-65, ch. 89; 1913 N.D. Laws 123-24, ch. 98, 
102. 1915 N.D. Laws 401-02, art. XVI.  The yes vote totaled 43,111; the no vote was 21, 
815.  Id. at 402. 
103. State ex rel. Linde v. Hall, 159 N.W. 281, 282 (N.D. 1916), overruled by State ex rel. 
Twichell v. Hall, 171 N.W. 213 (N.D. 1918). 
104. Linde, 159 N.W. at 282. 
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amendments was only enabling and still needed legislative action to 
implement it.105 
On September 11, 1916, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Goss in 
State ex rel. Linde v. Hall,106 the Supreme Court ruled that the 1914 consti-
tutional amendment authorizing initiated amendments was not self-
executing, and so the proposed capitol relocation amendment could not go 
on the ballot.107  In a remarkably rigid interpretation, the Court specifically 
held that legislative action was necessary for several reasons, including to 
designate the number of voters above “at least twenty-five percent of the 
legal voters in each of not less than one-half of the counties” needed to file 
a petition for an initiated amendment.108 
Three justices wrote concurring opinions.  Justice Burke’s one para-
graph insisted, “This case has received the most careful consideration by 
every member of the court . . . .”109  Justice Christianson wrote extensively, 
expanding on the reasoning of the main opinion.110  Justice Bruce’s short 
opinion criticized the “autocratic” conduct of the Secretary of State in 
taking it on himself to declare the petitions sufficient.111 
The Non-Partisan League apparently saw this decision, consigning all 
initiated amendments to legislative control, as hostile to the League’s plans 
to authorize public ownership of some businesses.  The League leadership 
believed that friendlier judges would be important in implementing its 
programs.112  After the Linde decision, the 1916 campaign centered on the 
contests for the Supreme Court. 
With Lynn Frazier and most of his associates on the [League’s] 
state ticket looking more and more like “sure things” in Novem-
ber, the campaign during the fall months boiled down for the most 
part to a single issue.  The Good Government League and the 
opposition press decided to concentrate their efforts on keeping 
control of the state Supreme Court, and the three League candi-
dates were subjected to both abuse and ridicule . . . .  Since the 
judges were elected on a separate nonpartisan judicial ballot, the 
chances were good that it would be neglected by many voters.  
The other three candidates for the positions on the five-man court 
 
105. Id. at 284. 
106. 159 N.W. 281 (N.D. 1916). 
107. Linde, 159 N.W. at 289. 
108. Id. at 287-88. 
109. Id. at 289. 
110. Id. at 290-99. 
111. Id. at 289-90. 
112. Meschke & Smith, supra note 3, at 243. 
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were incumbents and on the basis of past decisions the League was 
certain that they could be counted upon to join with their old 
colleagues to strike down any “radical” acts of a League 
legislature. 
Throughout the fall months almost the entire emphasis of the 
[Nonpartisan] Leader was upon the absolute necessity of electing 
the League judicial candidates if the work of the legislature was 
not to be thwarted.113 
The Nonpartisan Leader, the League’s weekly journal, published its 
endorsed candidates’ views on the function of the judiciary.114  “Robinson 
discussed his favorite theme of preference for the substance of justice over 
legal technicalities.”115 
The League-endorsed candidates won decisively: Robinson topped the 
field with 62,675 votes; Birdzell had 61,109; and Grace had 57,170.116  The 
incumbents trailed far behind: Chas. J. Fisk had 44,028; E.T. Burke, 
43,442; and Burleigh F. Spalding, 37,890.117 
Campaign animosities continued past the election.  A serious question 
arose regarding when the victors should take their offices. 
The 1889 Constitution directed: “The judges of the supreme court 
shall, immediately after the first election, . . . hold his office . . . from the 
first Monday in December, A.D., 1889.”118  Relying on this clause, 
Robinson, Grace, and Birdzell made known plans to begin work on the first 
Monday in December 1916.  One historian explained, “Several important 
cases were to be decided during the month of December, and it was 
generally assumed that the League was eager to utilize its new majority.”119 
The Attorney General quickly petitioned the Supreme Court for an 
“orderly determination . . . of the rights of the respective contenders.”120  
The three defeated justices disqualified themselves, and the two remaining 
justices, Bruce and Christianson, called three district judges as replace-
ments.121  The three temporary justices permitted Bruce and Christianson to 
 
113. MORLAN, supra note 41, at 83. 
114. Id. at 84. 
115. Id. 
116. See NORTH DAKOTA BLUE BOOK 263 (1919) (containing the 1919 N.D. Legislative 
Manual). 
117. Spaulding had defeated the incumbent, Goss, in the June 1916 primary.  NORTH 
DAKOTA VOTES, supra note 42, at 89. 
118. N.D. CONST. of 1889 art. IV, § 92 (1889) (repealed 1976). 
119. MORLAN, supra note 41, at 94. 
120. State ex rel. Linde v. Robinson, 160 N.W. 512, 512 (N.D. 1916)[Robinson I]. 
121. Id. 
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withdraw as well because “determination on the merits of the controversy 
may affect the tenure of [their] office . . .,” and also ordered the defeated 
justices, Burke, Fisk, and Goss, “be interpleaded as parties respon-
dent . . . .”122  The three temporary justices also named two more district 
judges as replacements.123 
In a counter-move, the three Justices-elect convened as the Supreme 
Court at noon on Thursday, December 7, 1916, and issued an order advising 
the “third court” that “you have no right or jurisdiction to appear as a court 
and to assume to hear and adjudicate” whether the Justices-elect properly 
held office.124 
Yet that afternoon, the “provisional court” of four District Judges 
Pollock, Nuessle, Crawford, and Leighton heard oral arguments on the 
petition by the Attorney General in the house chamber at the capitol “in the 
presence of a hundred or more spectators.”125  Attorneys William Lemke 
and William Langer (the newly elected attorney-general) represented the 
Justices-elect and argued the provisional court had no jurisdiction.126  Grace 
and Robinson also orally argued similarly.127  The Bismarck Tribune quoted 
Robinson extensively and headlined its story, “Justice-Elect [Robinson] 
Derides and Defies Provisional Body in Long Tirade.”128 
The four temporary justices promptly issued an opinion on Monday, 
December 11.129  The opinion130 concluded elected justices begin their 
terms on the first Monday in January of the year after they are elected.131 
In a closing paragraph, the opinion rebuked Robinson: 
During the course of the argument herein James E. Robinson, one 
of the judges-elect, threatened that, upon taking their seats the 
judges-elect would put aside and render nugatory the acts of this 
court as now constituted, as well as those of the court wherein 
Judges Fisk, Goss, and Burke have taken part since December 
4th.132 
 
122. Id. at 513. 
123. Id. at 514. 
124. North Dakota Has Two Too Many Courts,  BISMARCK TRIB., Dec. 7, 1916, at 1. 
125. Robinson Calls Supreme Court Picked Tribunal, BISMARCK TRIB., Dec. 8, 1916, at 1. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. State ex rel. Linde v. Robinson, 160 N.W. 514 (N.D. 1916) [Robinson II]. 
130. This opinion was recently described, oddly, as “[o]ne of the most cogent expositions of 
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Constitutional Interpretation, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 1269, 1270 (1993). 
131. Robinson II, 160 N.W. at 520. 
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The temporary Court expressed disbelief: “[W]e cannot bring ourselves to 
believe that the remaining judges-elect will support any such revolutionary 
action.”133 
Despite Robinson’s histrionics, the three Justices-elect apparently rec-
ognized the jurisdiction of the “old” Court during the rest of December.134  
The “old” Court continued to decide cases throughout December.135 
In January 1917, however, the “new” Court received several petitions 
to rehear those decisions.136  Those petitions were denied.137  One denial 
drew a harsh dissent from Robinson, the only “new” justice who parti-
cipated on the rehearing motions: “The case is a travesty on the admini-
stration of justice.”138 
The three newly elected justices joined sitting justices, Adolph M. 
Christianson, who was elected in 1914, and Andrew A. Bruce, on the first 
Monday in January 1917.139  Since he then had the shortest remaining term, 
the Constitution made Bruce Chief Justice.140  Before taking office, 
Robinson explained some of his philosophy to the press: 
The average jurist is, after all, a very ignorant man.  He knows the 
law, or pretends to, or honestly believes that he does.  But he 
doesn’t know enough of his fellow man; he is not familiar enough 
with the arts and the sciences; with the practical trades; he doesn’t 
know enough, as a rule, of the average man and woman; of their 
aspirations; their point of view.  Hemmed in at every side by the 
written law, we are too much inclined to ignore the higher law—
the rights of every man and woman.  Sometimes, we even go to 
the point where we place written law and precedent above sound 
common sense.  But, we are progressing.  We are, at least, not 
standing still.  And perhaps the time is not far distant when we will 
 
133. Id. 
134. A few days after the decision, Robinson notified the State Auditor “that he would be 
held legally responsible should he recognize any warrants for December salary presented by the 
retiring supreme court justices.”  Robinson Warns Auditor to Hold Up Judges’ Pay, BISMARCK 
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TRIB., Dec. 18, 1916, at 6. 
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138. Youmans v. Hanna, 161 N.W. 797, 806 (N.D. 1917) (Robinson, J., dissenting). 
139. Meschke & Smith,  supra note 3, at 307. 
140. The 1889 Constitution directed that the Supreme Court “judge having the shortest term 
to serve, not holding his office by election or appointment to fill a vacancy, shall be chief 
justice . . . .”  N.D. CONST. of 1889 art. IV, § 92 (repealed 1976). 
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find the key to simple justice, which is, after all, that thing in 
whose interests all laws are, presumably, written.141 
It must have disconcerted his colleagues when Robinson declared most 
judges were “ignorant.” 
Robinson also expressed a similarly unrestrained thought, stating that 
“[t]he judge of the future will be an alienist, a practical philanthropist, a 
man with a keen knowledge of all the sciences and above all a 
humanitarian.”142 
V. ROBINSON’S COURT 
A. SATURDAY EVENING LETTERS 
From the beginning, Robinson changed one thing dramatically.  He 
wrote a weekly letter to the public about the activities of the Court. The 
newspaper in the capitol city, The Bismarck Tribune, regularly published 
it.143  His Saturday Evening Letters (Letters) chronicled his years on a 
contentious appellate court. 
Robinson’s introductory Letter explained his principal purpose: “As I 
think the public officers should give to the Press and the public some 
regular account of their doings, my purpose is to submit to you a Saturday 
evening letter on the progress of the Supreme Court.”144  Later, Robinson 
expanded his objectives: 
 
141. Judge of the Future Will be Many-sided Expert Thinks J.E. Robinson, BISMARCK TRIB., 
Dec. 23, 1916, at 4. 
142. Id.  It is difficult to tell what shade of meaning Robinson intended with his use of 
“alienist.”  See THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ENCYCLOPEDIA AND DICTIONARY 133 (J.A. Hill & Co. 
1906) (defining alienist as “[o]ne skilled in the treatment of mental diseases.”).  Modern 
dictionaries define an “alienist” as “A psychiatrist who specializes in giving legal evidence.”  THE 
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 37 (Unabridged ed. 1976).  Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines alienist as “a psychiatrist, esp. one who assesses a criminal defendant’s 
sanity or capacity to stand trial.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 80 (8th ed. 2004).  The term did not 
appear in Black’s until the third edition in 1933! 
143. In his Letter published Tuesday, June 11, 1918, Robinson explained: “The letter is 
given free as sunshine.  It was sent to all the big dailies as long as they cared to use it.  Now I 
think it is published only by two progressive newspapers, The Bismarck Tribune and Jamestown 
Daily Alert.”  Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., June 11, 1918, at 4. 
144. The Supreme Court,  BISMARCK TRIB., Jan. 8, 1917, at 1.  Robinson recognized that it 
was the first time that ever a supreme court judge has undertaken to give the press and 
the people weekly Letters in regard to the public service.  On such matters the people 
have been kept in utter darkness, and, of course, they have had poor service, and so it 
must ever be until the press and the people show some special interest in public affairs 
and in the doings of their public servants. 
Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., July 21, 1917, at 4.  At the same time, he recognized 
“the editors of some big dailies do not like me and do not care to aid the cause of judicial reform 
by publishing my weekly Letters.”  Id.  Later, The Tribune said his Letters had “appeared 
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The purpose of these weekly Letters is to throw the light of 
publicity on the procedure of our courts and judges so each and all 
may have a greater incentive to do his duty and to make the public 
service as prompt and efficient as any private service.145 
As we will see, Robinson flooded “the light of publicity” on a difficult and 
dysfunctional Court.  Robinson’s innovation illuminated the judicial branch 
for public scrutiny. 
In his first Letter, Robinson began reporting his colleague’s attendance 
and activities: 
D[u]ring the past week all the Judges have worked five days.  We 
have heard arguments in a dozen cases that should have been 
considered and decided last May.  We have some ninety-five cases 
on the calendar and we purpose, if possible, to consider and decide 
those cases during the months of January and February, and then 
to keep right up with the work.146 
Later Letters gave even more details on their work. 
After his second week, Robinson expressed impatience with a system 
that had left so much work undone: 
The idea of any court being six months, or a year, or two years, 
behind with work is perfectly ridiculous.  If judges cannot keep up 
with their work, they should have manhood enough to resign.  For 
a judge to leave his work undone and to draw his salary for doing 
it is, in effect, the same as stealing the money. 
* * * 
We are still hampered with the old court rules and do not make 
progress with throwing them off and adopting new rules.147 
These thoughts became recurring themes in subsequent Letters. 
In mid-January 1917, Bruce and Robinson had a public squabble.  It 
came in oral argument on a special petition to recall the record for an 
unusual second rehearing in Youmans v. Hanna,148 one of the contentious 
cases decided by the lame-duck justices in late 1916.149  After their 
exchange of words, Robinson denounced an assertion by Bruce as “un-
 
regularly only in The Tribune” and boasted they had become “a national institution.”  Saturday 
Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Dec. 22, 1917, at 4. 
145. ROBINSON, supra note 39, at 69. 
146. The Supreme Court, BISMARCK TRIB., Jan. 8, 1917, at 1. 
147.  Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Jan. 15, 1917, at 4. 
148. 161 N.W. 797 (N.D. 1917). 
149. Robinson and Bruce Engage in Brief Tilt, BISMARCK TRIB., Jan. 17, 1917, at 1. 
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true.”150  This skirmish commenced years of personal conflict between 
Bruce and Robinson. 
Early on, Robinson aspired to a hard-working and well-prepared 
Court—a “hot court”—that would actively discuss each case with counsel 
at oral argument.  He explained why: 
Now it often happens that a lawyer has not a way of stating his 
case so as to appeal to the understanding of the judges and he may 
talk over their heads, while they sit and listen like dummies.  To 
prevent this I have assumed the task of looking into the records of 
every case before it is argued, and then I am in a position to state 
the case in a few words so that any person can understand it, and 
to direct counsel to the material points of the case and to discuss it 
with the lawyers.  In that way we save much time and come to a 
good understanding of the case.151 
Robinson’s colleagues did not meet his expectations. 
Every appellate judge ought to emulate Robinson in preparation.  
Thorough study of the briefs and records before each oral argument is 
important to make the most effective use of the appellate process. 
B. THE BACKLOG 
Robinson and his colleagues confronted a huge backlog.  One hundred 
fifty completed appeals awaited action.152 
At age seventy-four, Robinson remained vigorous.  And he urgently 
wanted to catch up with the work. 
“In his first year [1917] on the court, . . .[Robinson] wrote the amazing 
total of forty-eight opinions of the court, thirty-one dissents with opinions, 
and twenty-nine concurrences with opinions (a total of one hundred and 
eight written opinions) . . .,” according to former Justice Robert Vogel, who 
surveyed Robinson’s first years of work.153  Robinson was proficient, but 
the Court needed more than just his forceful efforts. 
Robinson knew how to bring the calendar current and soon explained it 
to his colleagues and the public: 
 
150. Id.  Robinson gave a premature public explanation of his view of that case in a Saturday 
Evening Letter.  Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Jan. 22, 1917, at 4.  Later, Robinson 
published his dissent in a Letter blasting the decision to deny the motion: “The case is a travesty 
on the administration of justice.” Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Mar. 19, 1917, at 4. 
151. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Jan. 22, 1917, at 4. 
152. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Sept. 28, 1918, at 6. 
153. Vogel, supra note 77, at 85. 
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We have still on hand about 70 old appeal cases.  To clean the 
slate, we must decide and finally dispose of ten cases every week.  
We must shunt [sic] down on motions for rehearing, which 
counsel are in the habit of making, just to ease their mind when a 
decision is given against them.  Though we incubate over a case 
for a year, it does not lessen the chance of error.  Without proper 
self-confidence, there is a lack of clear mental vision.  A person 
who is always in doubt and always hesitating and reconsidering, 
ceases to have a quick and clear perception.  He makes his mind a 
beast of burden. 
Under the present system a judge has to go over the details of a 
case several times and to keep it in his mind about two months.  
This is mental drudgery.  It is intolerable.  We must stop it.  Every 
case should be decided and finally disposed of within a few days 
after it is argue[d] or submit[ted].154 
His colleagues were slow to accept his suggestions, and Robinson 
repeatedly prodded his colleagues: 
The other judges have not yet come to follow my easy ways, and 
so they make themselves a lot of work.  They continue to write 
decisions which are too long and too learned to be published or 
read.  They take much time in criticizing my decisions . . . .155 
In the same Letter, in a single sentence, Robinson complained both about an 
unnamed colleague’s absence on long trips for American Bar Association 
(A.B.A.) meetings and about one who wrote long opinions.156  Robinson 
was clearly disapproving of Bruce who was most active in the A.B.A.157 
Robinson recognized past justices who would often “go off on long 
trips and leave their work undone and . . . they waste[d] [their] time in 
writing long-winded decisions.”158  But Robinson now believed “it will be 
different,” since the A.B.A. itself had recently “condemned the delays and 
technicalities of the judges and the writing of long-winded 
decisions . . . .”159 
 
154. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Feb. 24, 1917, at 4. 
155. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Mar. 10, 1917, at 4. 
156. Id. 
157. “[Bruce] has been on some of the more important committees of the American Bar 
Association, and was a delegate from that association to the World Congress of Jurists and 
Lawyers.  He was chairman of the Committee on Organization of the Judicial Section of the 
American Bar Association, and has read several papers before the association.” PROCEEDINGS 
1911, supra note 46, at 3-4. 
158. ROBINSON, supra note 39, at 70. 
159. Id. 
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In mid-March in 1917, Robinson complained pointedly about the slow 
pace and lack of concerted effort: 
During the past two weeks we have heard arguments in only two 
or three cases.  Some judges have been on the sick list, some ab-
sent, two, three or five days.  The judges have not yet adopted . . . 
any good working system.  Some cases that were argued early in 
January have not yet been decided, and I know of no good reason 
why competent judges should not decide every case within a week 
after it is argued.160 
Two months later, Robinson expressed his frustration about absent judges. 
This week all judges have all been present and at work.  Last week 
there was a general absence of from two to six days.  I do wish it 
were law that no state officer should receive his monthly pay 
without filing an affidavit showing his daily and monthly service.  
Then judges would not retire from office leaving a good part of a 
year’s work undone.161 
Robinson pressed hard for more concerted action to cut the backlog. 
C. ABSENCES AND DELAYS 
In June 1917, Robinson reported: 
This week we have heard arguments in eight cases.  Next week we 
hear arguments in 20 cases.  Then, during the June month, we 
purpose to write up and sign up on every case argued and 
submitted during this year.  Then the pending appeals will be re-
duced to about 50 cases.  In the meantime, so that our judges may 
be good and keep steadily at work and not run off and leave me, as 
they sometimes do, I must write a few Jeremiads.162 
His “jeremiads” had little effect. 
Robinson also complained about the Court’s inefficient procedures: 
The purpose of these Letters is to make the demand for reform 
more and more insistent by exposing the wrongs and showing how 
to right them.  The judges have been too much in the habit of 
covering up and concealing their own wrongs. 
* * * 
 
160. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Mar. 19, 1917, at 4. 
161. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., May 12, 1917, at 4. 
162. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., June 9, 1917, at 4.  A jeremiad is “a 
lamentation, mournful complaint.”  RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
766 (Unabridged ed. 1976). 
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Thus far there is a radical defect in our system of procedure.  We 
double our work by a system of nursing it.  We sit and hear argu-
ments day after day for a month or more and decide the cases in 
one, two or three months, when the arguments are forgotten.  Then 
we hear motions for review in every petty case and go all over the 
same old records, and the result is mental drudgery and a fearful 
waste of time.  But soon, very soon, I hope we will learn how to 
better conditions and to adopt rules to reduce the procedure to a 
more businesslike system.163 
There are cases, of course, requiring more research, study, and time 
than Robinson recognized.  The reasons vary from the complex or unusual 
nature of the case to the poor quality of the submissions by the lawyers in a 
case that will be a significant precedent.  But, in the main, Robinson rightly 
expected faster action and prompter disposition of the usual cases. 
After his first six months on the Court, Robinson reported hopefully on 
the status of the Court’s work. 
This time I have no scandal to write about absent judges.  We have 
all been good and have sworn a thousand oaths to catch up and to 
keep up with the court business.  Every judge has a pile of deci-
sions written up and ready for signing and we hope to dispose of 
them in short order.164 
Robinson was disappointed yet again. 
Robinson believed a justice’s unexcused absence from the Court was 
irresponsible. 
What are the causes of judicial inefficiency; why do courts waste 
time in hearing arguments without deciding cases?  When in one 
week the judges hear arguments in 12 or more cases, why do they 
not write up and sign up and dispose of them during the same or 
the next week, so as to average at least one decision a day?  The 
reason is that in court business, there is no business system.  
Hence, the business is delayed and the work of the court is dou-
bled.  One judge writes a decision and gives a copy to each of the 
other judges, who should examine it and concur or dissent within a 
week; but after the lapse of several weeks when a conference is 
called, one or more judges have not examined the case and so it 
goes over from week to week or month to month.  One cause of it 
is the absence of the judges.  They do not seem to realize that they 
 
163. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., June 9, 1917, at 4. 
164. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., June 30, 1917, at 4. 
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have sworn to do their duty faithfully, and that their duty is to be 
on time and at their work during business hours of every day, just 
the same as other hired men who get less pay. 
To one brother judge I say: What means it that one judge is absent 
today?  The answer i[s]: Has he not a perfect right to be absent?  I 
say: No, sir; he has no more right than any other hired man to steal 
his time and leave his work undone.  The theft of time is even 
worse than the theft of money.165 
Robinson left his readers to guess which colleague he accused of 
stealing part of his salary by absences.  We think it was widely understood 
at the time, and you, too, can identify who Robinson accused.166 
Robinson realized that he could do little more than publicize his 
colleagues’ absences and failings and hope they would respond to public 
opinion.  So he continued to lecture them. 
By needless delays the judges double their work.  They double it 
again in writing long-winded decisions on numerous trivial points 
of no merit, which deserve only a severe reprimand.  The work is 
also increased and delayed by lack of punctuality.  A judge does 
not feel ashamed to come to his chambers at 9:30 o’clock or 10 
o’clock in the morning or at 2 or 3 o’clock in the afternoon.  I am 
sure it is not thus with the workers of the Ford Motor company or 
with those who work on the streets of Bismarck.  They are on time 
to a minute and their work is amazingly efficient.  They sit down 
by a tree, eat their lunch and get up and work like men deserving 
honor and respect. 
I am the acting censor of the supreme court, . . . .  When my young 
judges play truant boy, come late to school, as they often do, or do 
not come at all for days, it is no pleasure for me to call them to 
time and to hear them say it is none of my business.  It is truly 
amazing that any judge should claim the right to go and come as 
he pleases and to hold up and delay the court’s business.  But such 
is the fact.  Were the judges hired to do the same work for a James 
Hill or any good business company they would do it promptly or 
promptly lose their jobs.  But the judges are appointed for life or 
for a term of years, and nobody can discharge them.  They are put 
 
165. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., July 7, 1917, at 4. 
166. Two weeks later, Robinson wrote more about an unnamed justice’s absences: “This 
week we charged one judge with an absence of two full days and now hope that he will make up 
for a month of lost time.” Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., July 21, 1917, at 4. 
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upon their honor and left free to do as they please.  Too often they 
forget that they have sworn to do their duty faithfully and to 
sustain the constitution and to administer justice without denial or 
delay; and the editors of newspapers do not care to publish of a 
judge that he is a thief; that he steals his time or disregards his 
oath.  Still, for such wrongs the only present remedy is by 
continuously pointing them out with the finger of publicity . . . 
[T]he first step is to make of ours a model court, with model rules 
and model business methods.  We must learn to be on time and 
dispose of court business in a business way and to waste no time in 
writing long, stuffy decisions, or on the hearing of endless 
arguments.167 
After this “finger of publicity,” Robinson felt the need to defend his own 
brief absence: 
During August we do not hear arguments; but four of the judges 
remain at work to clean up the slate and make up for lost time.  On 
every case thus far submitted I have written a special opinion, 
concurring or dissenting, as it may be, and these I leave with our 
good clerk.  Now, having no work on hand I am off to my harvest 
and threshing.  Goodbye.168 
Robinson was back at work ten days later, “where, until Christmas, I 
purpose to be on time to a minute every day—and I pray that my good 
friends the other judges may do likewise.”169 
Robinson’s complaints about absences, delays, and inefficiencies 
continued: 
We now have pending 25 appeals which were submitted in the 
days of long ago.  These we hope to sign up and dispose of during 
the present month, and in the first week of September to com-
mence the hearing of new case[s], so as to clean the slate during 
the present year.  Still we must count on some disappointment be-
cause of a chronic system which is radically wrong. 
As it seems, one judge has a good reason for going off all next 
week and so we must excuse him.  Two judges who have been 
longest in office are now absent without leave.  They are at 
Dickinson, hobnobbing and feasting with the members of the Bar 
association, and of this, the propriety is at least very questionable; 
 
167. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Aug. 4, 1917, at 5. 
168. Id. 
169. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Aug. 20, 1917, at 4. 
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but next year is coming fast.  Then there is to be an election, and in 
the meantime it may behoove some public servants to be good and 
at their post of duty.170 
Robinson plainly hoped his “fingers of publicity” before the 1918 election, 
when Bruce would be up for re-election, would pressure Bruce to stick to 
the work at hand. 
Robinson’s exasperation, however, did not go away: 
This week I am as blue as Jeremiah the Prophet.  During the 
present year most of our judges have been six weeks absent from 
their post of duty.  During the past two weeks we have done 
nothing.  One judge is off to New York; one at Chicago; one on 
the exemption board.  We have 25 cases which were submitted 
months ago and they are still undecided.  We have a system of 
doing business which doubles our work.171 
Occasionally, Robinson became hopeful about possibilities of 
improvement, but generally he despaired of any real progress. 
We are looking for the return of our Chief Justice from a session 
of the American Bar Association at New York.  It was well for 
him to be there as that great body of wise lawyers passed a 
resolution charging all the judges to cease writing those long 
decisions against which we have so often argued and protested.  
Indeed they commended to the judges the principles of judicial 
reform advocated in these Letters.  A prophet is not without honor 
save in his own country.  I hope we have seen the last of the long-
winded decisions (20 or 40 pages) imposing needless burdens 
upon the suitors and tax payers. 
We still have hope that from now on during the present year each 
judge of our court will take some pride in devoting all his time to 
his duties at the capitol so that by Christmas we may be right up 
with the work.  During the past five weeks we have made little 
progress.  We have not had a quorum of the judges. . . .  [I]t seems 
vain to hope for greater efficiency until the people and the press 
demand it and make the demand manifest and emphatic.172 
Still, Robinson went on publicly pushing for improvement.173 
 
170. Id. 
171. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Sept. 3, 1917, at 5. 
172. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Sept. 8, 1917, at 4. 
173. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Sept. 15, 1917, at 4  (“The public servants 
must be given to understand that their time belongs to the state and when they steal their time they 
steal money and put themselves on a par with money stealers, that is to say, with common 
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As the year went on, Robinson sometimes became glumly optimistic 
about a potential for progress: 
This week all our judges have been at work and I think they are 
well disposed to try to make up for lost time.  We have now . . . 
some eighty appeals which have not been argued and forty appeals 
argued and submitted and ready for conferences.  If we clean up all 
the forty cases this month we may dispose of most of the rest 
during December, but it seems there is little chance of cleaning the 
slate during the present year.174 
At the same time, Robinson publicly complained about Chief Justice Bruce 
permitting overlong oral arguments and conferences. 
Our time record is not good.  We spend too much time in hearing 
mere talk and in conferences on small matters—in deciding cases 
and re-considering them to please offended counsel and in doing 
the same work over and over. 
* * * * 
One cause of delay is the hearing of long arguments on kinder-
garten matters.  Our chief justice in his kindness is never disposed 
to shut off needless talk.  He does not want to offend the lawyers.  
He says: “Let them talk.  They have a constitutional right to 
talk.”175 
Robinson also complained about “l[u]mbersome whale decisions,” in-
cluding an eighteen-page opinion by Justice Grace that Robinson boiled 
down to one page to show how it could be done.176 
Robinson’s public attention to his colleagues’ absences and delays did 
not sit well with them.177 He realized this:  
This week all our judges have been present and at work, but not al-
ways promptly on time.  Last week one judge was absent six days 
and one for three days.  I do not think either one would thank me 
for giving his name.178 
 
thieves.”); Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Sept. 29, 1917, at 4 (“This week our court 
has made little progress.”); Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Oct. 6, 1917, at 4 (“During 
the last two months our court has made little progress.”); Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK 
TRIB., Jan. 26, 1918, at 4 (“This week I can report no progress.”). 
174. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 12, 1917, at 4. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Likely, Robinson’s other eccentric antics at the Court also perturbed his colleagues.  See 
Meschke & Smith, supra note 3, 246, 246 n.184. 
178. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., July 14, 1917, at 4. 
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Yet, by modern standards of judicial conduct, Robinson’s public reports on 
repeated absences and constant delays promoted important judicial 
values.179 
D. REFORMING RULES 
In September 1917, Robinson explained how he had tried to get new 
rules to improve the Court’s procedures: “Last January I submitted to the 
court a draft of rules to expedite and better the practice which appeared to 
meet with the approval of the other judges but so far we have had so much 
absence and so many delays that we have not adopted a single rule.”180  It 
took even longer for the Court to improve the rules. 
In October 1917, Robinson reported a little progress on rules.181  
Explaining judicial procedures to his readers, Robinson praised his Court 
for eliminating the old system of holding a single term of court each six 
months.182  “Now every day is a term day,” he rejoiced, so that a completed 
appeal could be heard whenever it was ready, rather than waiting up to nine 
months for an arbitrarily fixed hearing date.183  Wisely, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court has kept this practice of a continuous term.184  The Court 
schedules oral arguments each month (except July and August) for nearly 
all appeals ready by the middle of the prior month.185 
Robinson applauded a rule revision that did away with the need for a 
printed record in every appeal.  “The printing was a cause of delay and of 
terrible expense,” he explained.186  Robinson also scolded attorneys for fil-
ing lengthy briefs that often contained “40 to 80 assignments of error.  That 
is folly.”187 
Robinson accused trial attorneys of causing needless delays and ex-
penses by raising “a continuous string of exceptions and objections to every 
question.”188  He argued that witnesses were often hindered in telling the 
 
179. “The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all the judge’s other activities.”  
N.D. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3A (2004-2005).  “A judge shall dispose of all judicial 
matters promptly, efficiently and fairly.”  Id. at 3B(8). 
180. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Sept. 15, 1917, at 4. 
181. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Oct. 13, 1917, at 4. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. “Presently, a case is assigned to the next court term at least 17 days after the brief of the 
appellee or cross-appellee is filed.”  N.D. R. APP. P. 45 Explanatory Note. 
185. Id. 
186. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Oct. 13, 1917, at 4. 
187. Id.  The North Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure limit the length of briefs; principal 
briefs are limited to 10,500 words or 40 pages and reply briefs to 2,500 words or ten pages.  N.D. 
R. APP. P. 32(a)(7)(A),(B). 
188. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Oct. 13, 1917, at 4. 
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truth by “persistent objections and rulings of the court.  It is high time to put 
a stop to that kind of practice.”189  Robinson believed judges and lawyers 
shared responsibility for improving the system. 
Robinson coached lawyers on how to present oral arguments: 
Young lawyers do some time[s] come to court with a set speech on 
fundamental principles of the law with extracts from the sayings of 
numerous judges.  Then we may give them a gentle hint that we 
know all about it and do not play second fiddle to any other 
judges.  The best argument a lawyer can make is to state in few 
words and in proper consecutive order the facts, the law and the 
c[o]ntrolling principles of the case.190 
This remains good advice to lawyers. 
Robinson prevailed on his colleagues to adopt an “efficient” method 
for handling new cases while they ground away on the old ones.191  “Hence, 
we make it a rule to decide every case within two weeks after it is 
submitted, but we have still pending quite a number of old cases which 
were submitted before the rule took effect.”192  He explained, “[I]n this 
state . . . judges are sworn to do their duty faithfully and to observe the 
constitution which provides for justice without denial or delay.”193 
Robinson described other unnecessary causes of delay: 
This week we had before the court an argument on a big divorce 
suit . . . [that] was argued at great length some six months ago, but 
the chief justice was then absent, and as some of the judges had no 
longer a fresh memory of the case it was thought well to have a 
second argument in the nature of a refresher.  On each side the 
counsel talked for two hours.194 
Robinson, thus, deftly demonstrated how a single absence complicated their 
work and nimbly blamed Bruce for this delay. 
Robinson insisted the Supreme Court failed in its constitutional duty to 
supervise the trial courts.195 
 
189. Id. 
190. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Mar. 22, 1918, at 4. 
191. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Oct. 13, 1917, at 4. 
192. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Oct. 27, 1917, at 4 
193. Id. 
194. Id. 
195. “The supreme court . . . shall have a general superintending control over all inferior 
courts under such regulations and limitations as may be prescribed by law.” N.D. CONST. of 1889 
art. IV, § 86 (repealed 1976).  Today’s constitution declares: “The supreme court shall have 
authority to promulgate rules of procedure, including appellate procedure, to be followed by all 
the courts of this state. . . .”  N. D. CONST. art. VI, § 3. 
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There are few who can be trusted to work for others without any 
control or supervision and without some system of reporting.  
Assuredly every judge and state officer should give at least a 
monthly report of his doings. 
By the constitution the supreme court is charged with the duty of 
supervising all inferior courts, though the duty has been sadly 
neglected.  There has been no supervision and no reporting to any 
one.  The result is that some judges have held cases under incuba-
tion for a whole year.  It has taken two, three and four years to 
work some cases through the courts.  I have heard of judges leav-
ing their work and going off and spending the winter in Florida or 
in California, and of judges leaving their work and spend a large 
part of their time in trying to get votes; but I [n]ever heard of any 
of them failing to draw their salary.  It is no uncommon thing for a 
judge to send a man to prison for a theft of $20 or $30 . . . , but it is 
quite uncommon for a judge to sentence himself to prison when he 
steals pay of several hundred dollars for work left undone.  And 
surely the one theft is just as bad as the other.196 
“Under proper rules and supervision, and a proper system of reporting,” 
Robinson declared, “it is fair to assume that all the courts would be more 
faithful and efficient.”197 
Later, Robinson summarized the basic organization and procedures for 
the Supreme Courts of North Dakota, Illinois, Montana, Wisconsin, and the 
United States.198  He deplored “the usual delays and the fearful expense” of 
litigation, but heaped credit on his own Court: “In North Dakota, the 
Supreme Court has nearly reduced to a minimum the delays of the law and 
the expense of an appeal . . . .”199 
E. PREMATURE OPINIONS 
In his Letters, Robinson sometimes gave his views on a pending case 
before the Court had decided it.200  Today, this would subject a judge to 
certain discipline.201 
 
196. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Mar. 3, 1917, at 4. 
197. ROBINSON, supra note 39, at 66. 
198. Id. at 57. 
199. Id. 
200. An early example was in The Bismarck Tribune, on Saturday, March 31, 1917, where 
Robinson said the Court should deny Attorney General William Langer’s pending petition to 
invalidate Governor Frazier’s appointments to the board of regents. Saturday Evening Letter, 
BISMARCK TRIB., Mar. 31, 1917, at 1.  A bold example was on Saturday, May 19, 1917, where he 
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While the United States Supreme Court in White valued free speech 
over preserving the appearance of impartiality in judicial elections, the 
White opinion certainly did not undercut all control of judicial speech de-
signed to improve impartiality within the judicial process.202 
In Robinson’s time, however, no written rules or statutes governed 
judicial speech.203  North Dakota did not have a code of judicial ethics until 
1977, six decades after Robinson.204  Thus, the Court had no way to put a 
stop to Robinson’s public expressions on pending cases. 
In October 1917, Robinson described his unusual practice of sending a 
“tentative opinion” to counsel before oral argument.205  He rationalized this 
novel effort at efficiency in an accompanying form letter to counsel: “If you 
concur with me it may save you a trip to Bismarck.  If you dissent, it will 
give you my views in advance and can do you no harm.”206  Unfortunately, 
Robinson acted unilaterally without his colleagues’ prior approval of this 
abrupt break from tradition.207  Undoubtedly, this too further unsettled his 
relations with his fellow justices, and it exposed him to accusations of 
unethical conduct.208 
F. OPINION WRITING 
Robinson often grumbled about overlong opinions that encumbered the 
Court’s work. 
According to the Docket of the West Publishing company, based 
on a count of the average number of words in the decisions of the 
several state courts, the longest decisions are given in North Da-
kota.  That is a sorry compliment to our Supreme Court.  It shows, 
 
published a proposed opinion “in which the Court has not yet concurred.” Saturday Evening 
Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., May 19, 1917, at 4. 
201. “A judge shall not, while a proceeding is pending or impending in any court, make any 
public comment that might reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness or 
make any nonpublic comment that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing.”  N.D. 
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3B(9) (2004-2005). 
202. See generally Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (valuing politi-
cal speech over some rules of judicial conduct). 
203. “The first code regulating judicial conduct was adopted by the ABA in 1924.” White, 
536 U. S. at 786 (citing 48 ABA REP. 74 (1923) (report of Chief Justice Taft); P. MCFADDEN, 
ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS 86 (1990)). 
204. See Meschke & Smith, supra note 3, at 276. 
205. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Oct. 13, 1917, at 4. 
206. Id. 
207. There are other examples of Robinson’s premature opinions. See Saturday Evening 
Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., July 20, 1918, at 4 (offering an “advanced opinion” on a pending case). 
208. Robinson later claimed he did so “only in rare and plain cases.”  James E. Robinson, 
“Peculiarities” in the Administration of Justice in North Dakota—Justice Robinson’s 
Explanation, 88 CENT. L.J. 155, 156 (1919). 
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as the fact is, that the decisions consist largely of mere stuffing in 
the form of quotations and citations. For a judge to say to his 
stenographer: Copy the complaint, this document, and this 
testimony, is much easier than it is for him to give a concise and 
terse statement of the same.  Hence the long decision is no 
compliment.209 
This blunt sermon had little effect. 
Robinson attributed much of the Court’s poor performance to overlong 
opinions. 
Following the woeful habit of lading men with burdens grievous to 
be borne we write long winded decisions of 20, 30 or 40 pages, 
regardless of the cost of transcribing, booking and publishing the 
same amounting to about $20 a page.  By actual count of words 
our court decisions are much longer than any other state in the 
union.  We let the stenographer copy pleadings, statute, contracts 
and evidence and take no pride in condensing anything.  Our state 
reports are swollen by inserting a large part of the brief of counsel 
just as if the court reporter stood in with the bookmaker.  The 
proper way is to omit briefs to make short and prompt decisions 
and to make the printed decisions show when each case was sub-
mitted and when decided.  Thus in West Virginia and in Montana 
reports there are no briefs and the average length of a decision is 
about four pages, and at the head of each decision there is given 
the date when the case was submitted and when decided.210 
Robinson believed “long and complicated opinions . . . are never 
read.”211 
Robinson tried to teach his colleagues how to improve their opinion 
writing.  “Goldsmith once said to Samuel Johnson: ‘Doctor, if you were to 
write a fable about little fishes you would make them talk like whales.’  
And so it is with some of our judges.  They seem to pride themselves on 
writing whale decisions and whale sentences.”212  Robinson went on to 
quote “four such sentences copied from a recent decision by one of our 
 
209. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., May 19, 1917, at  4. 
210. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Sept. 3, 1917, at 5. 
211. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Feb. 10, 1917, at 4. “Some judges take pride 
in writing long and complicated decisions, which are never read.  And in this state the average 
length of a Supreme Court decision is greater than in any other state.  This habit we purpose to 
reverse.” Id. 
212. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 3, 1917, at 4. 
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judges.”213  Robinson lectured his colleagues on good composition in other 
Letters, as well.214 
Robinson pointed out: “Under the constitution when a cause or matter 
is [sic] considered and decided, the reasons must be concisely stated in 
writing, signed by the judges and filed so as to become a public record.”215  
To emphasize conciseness, Robinson deplored the public expense of 
publishing long opinions.216 
Robinson instructed on how to write concisely: 
In drafting a decision, it is not uncommon for a judge to give a 
literal copy of the complaint, answer, findings, Letters, testimony 
and a copy of a long statute.  Of course that is easier than to state 
the gist or substance of such things, but as a rule such a 
composition is slovenly and slip-shod; it shows no just regard for 
time or expense; [and] the time of the reader and the expense of 
booking the lumbersome matter. 
A brief or a decision in proper form commences with a lucid and 
coherent statement of the case, the facts and the law in one or two 
short paragraphs.  The reasoning or discussion may cover three, 
four or five paragraphs.  The final summary [or] conclusion, one 
paragraph.  The whole may not exceed four or five pages and of 
course it must be all lucid, coherent and in good marching order.217 
Sometimes Robinson’s criticism of a colleague’s writing style could be 
very blunt.  In one Letter for his “class in grammar,” Robinson singled out 
an opinion, written by Grace, as “three times too long.  He repeats and uses 
many redundant words, not thinking that for every idle word he must give 
 
213. See id.  He did not name the justice.  Id.  But see Huber v. Zeisler, 164 NW 131, 132 
(N.D. 1917) (naming Grace as the author). 
214. See, e.g., Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 26, 1917, at 4; Saturday 
Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Dec. 22, 1917, at 4; Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., 
Dec. 29, 1917, at 4; Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Jan. 21, 1918, at 4. 
215. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Sept. 21, 1918, at 4.  See N.D. CONST. of 
1889 art. IV, §101 (repealed 1976) (explaining the importance of being concise). “When a 
judgment or decree is reversed or confirmed by the supreme court every point fairly arising upon 
the record of the case shall be considered and decided, and the reasons therefore shall be concisely 
stated in writing, signed by the judges concurring . . . .”  Id.  That same language remains in 
today’s North Dakota Constitution.  N.D. CONST. art. V, § 5. 
216. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Sept. 21, 1918, at 4. 
217. Id. 
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an account in the day of judgment.”218  Robinson also quoted other 
examples and suggested a more concise phrasing for each.219 
Similarly, Robinson singled out another colleague’s overlong opinion. 
In the Motor Vehicle Tax case, Justice Birdzell has just filed a 
majority decision of some 27 large typewritten pages.  Of course, I 
have not much time to read it.  It looks like a mass of words 
dictated or thrown together in an off hand manner.  Doubtless it 
would be very different if the learned justice followed the example 
of Lord Bacon and with his own hand wrote his decision two or 
three times before giving the same to his stenographer.220 
Robinson also complained about the length of the headnotes written for 
the Court’s decisions: 
In North Dakota more than any other state ther[e] has prevailed a 
habit of making lumbering court decisions.  Most of the decisions 
might be reduced one-half by revising them into clear and concise 
language.  The same is true of the head notes which are usually 
called the syllabus.  The purpose of a head note is to show at a 
glance the leading points of the decision.  Hence, it should consist 
of not more than three or four simple sentences.221 
Robinson particularly criticized a 4,800 word opinion “in a petty case of no 
merit” involving only $107.222 
Robinson made a persuasive plea for brevity: “[L]ife is short and so the 
long lumbering decisions must go.  We have not time to write them or to 
read them nor money to pay the expense of booking a mass of useless 
stuff.”223 
 
218. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Feb. 11, 1918, at 4.  See Saturday Evening 
Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., May 27, 1918, at 5 (reminding Grace of his own campaign remarks 
criticizing long-winded opinions and promising  “clear and more concise” opinions). 
219. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Feb. 11, 1918, at 4.  See Saturday Evening 
Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., May 27, 1918, at 5 (naming each justice, including himself, and 
itemizing how many opinions and pages each justice had in volume 37 of the North Dakota 
Reports).  He editorialized: 
There is no possible reason or excuse for spreading a judicial opinion or decision over 
more than four, five or six printed pages.  The long-winded decisions must go.  They 
are contrary to all business principles.  They are monuments of folly.  They serve no 
good purpose only to lumber the record, make needless expense, and to wast[e] and 
fritter away the valuable time of the judges, and that is one of the reasons why we are 
so fearfully behind . . . . 
Id. 
220. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., June 17, 1918, at 4. 
221. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Feb. 18, 1918, at 4. 
222. Id. 
223. ROBINSON, supra note 39, at 86. 
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“In formulating a legal decision the greatest care should be taken to 
avoid the use of every needless word and to state the facts and the law of 
the case in a few simple marching sentences and paragraphs,” Robinson 
urged.224  His recommended method remains a model for modern judges. 
Robinson was frustrated by the voluminous case citations that lawyers 
put in their briefs and that were too often repeated in his colleagues’ 
opinions.  Thus: 
For instance, in 35 N.D. 244-274 [sic] there is a thirty-page case in 
which the attorneys and the court cite over five hundred decisions 
from other states.  The citations cover some nine pages; and for 
booking the useless stuff, the people do pay about $20 a page.  I 
purpose to ask the next legislature to “cut that all out” and to make 
no appropriation for reporting any decision in excess of four or 
five pages.225 
Robinson was “well versed in the classics and the Bible, and often 
quoted both in his opinions.  He decried the writing of long opinions and 
citation of a long list of authorities.  He [took] pride in the fact that his 
opinions rarely exceeded in length over two legal size pages of typewriter 
paper,”226 according to John Henry Newton, longtime Clerk of the Supreme 
Court.227  Yet, as Justice Vogel observed, only eight of his first one hundred 
and eight opinions contained citations of case law.228 
G. MORE DELAYS 
In January 1918, Robinson reported “no progress,”: “All of the week 
our Chief Justice has been absent without leave or license and our good 
looking young judge, the pride of our court, has been absent a great [deal] 
of the time.”229 
In March 1918, Robinson again reported very little progress on the 
huge backlog: 
This week our court has not done much to clear the calendar.  No 
man can do his duty as a Supreme Court Judge without giving to 
the work six or seven hours every day.  There are still on the 
 
224. Id. at 87. 
225. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Sept.  28, 1918, at 6. 
226. See Meschke & Smith, supra note 3, at 245 (quoting J.H. Newton, Lecture No. 1 at the 
University of North Dakota School of Law, at 8 (1950)) (lecture notes available at the North 
Dakota Supreme Court Law Library). 
227. Meschke & Smith, supra note 3, at 237.  Newton began service with the Court in 1913.  
Id. 
228. Vogel, supra note 77, at 85. 
229. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Jan. 26, 1918, at 4. 
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calendar 90 cases awaiting argument and 40 cases awaiting a 
prompt decision and some of them have been waiting a long, long 
time.230 
Astonishingly, in the fourteen months after January 1, 1917, the Court had 
only pared twenty cases of the 150 pending cases it started with—less than 
one and a half per month.231  No wonder that Robinson remained exas-
perated and frustrated. 
Robinson expanded his list of causes of delays to add long-winded 
arguments and collegiate courtesies: 
In the Trading Stamp case which should have been considered and 
decided in two hours, we sat and heard six great lawyers talk for 
two whole days and it all amounted to nothing.  It was mere waste 
of time.  In the big Minot Divorce case we heard the lawyers talk 
for nearly two days . . . .  The real object of argument as usually 
conducted is to confuse and mislead the Judges and not to 
enlighten them. 
* * * * 
There are other causes of delay.  We have too many judges and too 
much senatorial courtesy.  When a decision is written and signed 
by a [majority] of the Judges, one Judge may hold up the case 
indefinitely by just failing to concur or dissent.  In that way some 
decisions are held up for months.232 
Robinson concluded, “We have a system which doubles our work and as it 
seems we do not know enough or do not care to improve it.”233 
Later, Robinson complained that in “one of the old chronic cases, a 
decision was formulated and signed by three of the judges in November, 
1917, and since then it has been held up for one judge to dissent.”234  
 
230. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Mar. 11, 1918, at 4.  Nearly two weeks later, 
Robinson said, “This week the judges have made no default.” Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK 
TRIB., Mar. 22, 1918, at 4. 
231. Compare Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Mar. 11, 1918, at 4 (identifying 
that only 40 of 130 pending cases were heard) with Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., 
Sept. 28, 1918, at 6 (stating that the beginning backlog was 50 completed appeals awaiting 
action). 
232. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Mar. 11, 1918, at 4.  A month later, 
Robinson again complained about a two-day argument and five-month delay after three justices 
had signed an opinion that was still held up waiting for action by the two justices who had not 
signed.  Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Apr. 13, 1918, at 4.  A month later, Robinson 
complained about a “ghost case . . . in which the decision was signed by three judges six months 
ago,” and added: “Truly that is carrying judicial courtesy to the limit of absurdity.” Saturday 
Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., May 18, 1918, at 4. 
233. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Mar. 11, 1918, at 4. 
234. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., June 17, 1918, at 4. 
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Robinson expressed even more frustration over the fact that a dissent had 
just been written “and it is signed by one of the three judges who had signed 
the first opinion.”235  Robinson thereupon proposed four new rules to his 
colleagues entitled, “To Expedite Court Business and to Prevent Doubling 
the Work by Delaying It.”236  The first three dealt with how to assign cases 
to promote efficiency, and the forth confronted the effect of absences: 
When any judge is absent without unanimous consent for more 
than one day in a week, the other judges shall go on with the work 
of the court and hand down decisions without waiting for his con-
currence or dissent, which may be given or filed during the time 
for a rehearing.237 
In June 1918, Robinson described how the backlog had become 
chronic: 
[O]ur Supreme Court has on its calendar ninety-five cases not yet 
argued or submitted, and thirty-seven of the fifty cases submitted 
prior to the first day of May.  Some of these are old chronic ap-
peals that should have been decided six to ten months ago.  As our 
Chief Justice [Bruce] has decided to retire from office when his 
term expires, we are very anxious to aid him in cleaning the slate 
so that he may retire with credit.  The prior Chief Justice retired 
leaving on the docket 150 appeals and his predecessor left 192 
appeals, and still each of them claims great credit for experience, 
ability, and efficiency, . . . .238 
Robinson blamed Chief Justice Bruce for the logjam.  “The Chief Justice is 
the captain of the judicial team.  It is for him to say when to play ball.”239 
The rest of the justices shared some responsibility, Robinson reasoned.  
“[W]e have a way of doubling the work by holding it up and [by] delaying 
it, by writing long-winded decisions and by hearing long arguments which 
serve only to mislead and confuse the judicial mind.”240 
“In doing judicial business,” Robinson urged, “[t]he right way is for 
each judge during business hours of every day to give all his time to the 
 
235. Id. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. 
238. ROBINSON, supra note 39, at 80 (combining material from two Letters published in The 
Bismarck Tribune, on Tuesday, June 11, 1918, and Tuesday, June 18, 1918, and an unpublished 
Letter dated June 1, 1918). 
239. Id. 
240. Id. at 81. 
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business, . . . and do it well and to decide every case within a few days after 
the argument and while it is still fresh in the memory.”241 
Robinson summarized his private correspondence with the Chief 
Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, who outlined their “new system” 
and told Robinson they were “get[ting] along very well under this 
practice . . . .”242  After that, Robinson repeatedly urged his Court to use the 
Minnesota system of efficient scheduling and frequent conferences.  Thus, 
We are bound to adopt the Minnesota system and to cease 
doubling our work by delaying it.  In Minnesota the supreme court 
work is fully twice as much as it is in this state, and as the chief 
justice writes, they have reduced the work to a system; they have 
daily conferences following arguments and go over every case 
while it is still fresh in the mind and so the decision of a case is 
rarely delayed longer than one month after argument.  Now since 
the Minnesota judges are able to promptly dispose of their work, 
with half their efficiency, we should be able to do half as much 
work and in that way to keep right up with the work of our 
court.243 
Later in July 1918, Robinson again grumbled about inheriting “a very 
bad working system.”244 
And we have been so stupid as to follow in their ways.  We have 
willfully and deliberately doubled our work by a system of 
procrastination, wasting our time in hearing arguments and seldom 
considering a case until the argument is forgotten.  Now we must 
completely undo and reverse that system and, when we do so, it 
will give me great pleasure to write you about it.245 
Despite his repetitive prodding, Robinson saw little progress and became 
depressed.  
This week I feel like Bunyan’s Pilgrim when he fell into the 
Slough of Despair.  The reason is that when I come to court at 9 
a.m. I look for my judicial brethren, and they are nowhere to be 
found.  Hence, we make little progress in disposing of the chronic 
cases that were argued and should have been decided a year ago.246 
 
241. Id. 
242. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., June 24, 1918, at 4. 
243. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., July 15, 1918, at 8. 
244. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., July 29, 1918, at 4. 
245. Id. 
246. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., July 20, 1918, at 4. 
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By September 1918, Robinson despaired of catching up anytime soon.  
He reported: 
When I first took office I really hoped that by this time our Court 
would be up with its work and have a clean slate so as to decide 
every appeal within thirty days, but that is all a matter of the 
future. 
On January 1, 1917, when three judges were retired, . . . they left 
undecided 150 appeals when they should have left a clean slate.  
At present there are undecided 166 appeals.  Fifty of these were 
argued and submitted and most of them should have been decided 
in the days of long ago.  Now, what are the reasons for such a 
gross failure to administer justice without delay: . . .  [O]ne of the 
chief reasons is that each judge does feel perfectly at liberty to 
follow the old custom, to do his work or leave it undone, to pass a 
large part of his time in fishing, hunting, speech-making or in 
some outing.  There is rarely a day or a week that all of the judges 
are to be found at their chambers during regular business hours; 
some are nearly always absent or tardy for one, two or three days 
in a week.  They do not seem to think it a sin or a shame to draw a 
good salary for doing work which is left undone. . . .  To clear the 
slate we must allow less time for talk, write shorter decisions, and 
give full time to the work.247 
Given their troublesome backlog, Robinson’s insistence on less talk, shorter 
opinions, and concerted effort was understandable. 
H. BRUCE’S COUNTERATTACK 
Blistered by Robinson’s incessant criticisms, Bruce found a way to 
strike back.  After he chose not to seek re-election, Bruce publicly attacked 
Robinson for unethical conduct. 
Bruce’s counterattack came in another politically polarized case, a 
sequel to the one decided shortly before the 1916 general election.  The 
1917 legislature did nothing to implement the constitutional amendment 
authorizing popularly initiated amendments, as directed by the 1916 
decision in Linde.248  Despite that hiatus, several petitions to initiate consti-
tutional amendments were circulated, signed, and filed with the Secretary of 
 
247. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Sept. 28, 1918, at 6. 
248. State ex rel. Linde v. Hall, 159 N.W. 281 (N.D. 1916). 
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State in 1918.249  The sponsors apparently anticipated the new majority on 
the Court would rule differently than the 1916 Court.250 
When the Secretary of State approved the new petitions for balloting at 
the November 1918 general election, a taxpayer petitioned the Supreme 
Court to enjoin the Secretary of State from placing them on the ballot.251  
The petitioner principally relied on the controversial 1916 precedent, Linde, 
that held the amendment authorizing popularly initiated constitutional 
amendments needed legislative implementation.252 
On October 5, 1918, a three-justice majority, those endorsed and 
elected by the Non-Partisan League in 1916, filed three separate opinions to 
decide Twichell.253  Together, the majority opinions expressly reversed the 
controversial 1916 decision.254  Each of the three wrote an opinion explain-
ing why stare decisis did not control.255 
Thus, Birdzell wrote: “A careful study . . . leads us to the conclusion 
that the [Linde] interpretation of the amendment in question was so extreme 
in the direction of nullifying its force that it ought not to stand as the final 
expression of this court.”256  Their Twichell decision held the 1914 constitu-
tional amendment was indeed self-executing to authorize submission of a 
qualified initiated petition to the voters without further action by the 
legislature.257 
 
249. State ex rel. Twichell v. Hall, 171 N.W. 213, 221 (N.D. 1918) (Birdzell, J., concurring). 
250. Robinson had given the public reason to expect a more favorable ruling. Saturday 
Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Mar. 18, 1918, at 4.  In his March 18, 1918, Letter in The 
Bismarck Tribune, Robinson had said: 
Some two years ago the judges of the supreme court held that this amendment is not 
self-executing and that it must remain a dead letter without any force or effect until 
such time as the legislature may see fit to doctor it up with supplemental legislation.  
The decision was roundly denounced.  It did not appeal to the people.  Three of the 
judges who made the decision were promptly let out and replaced by three judges who 
openly disapproved of the decision. 
Id. 
251. Twichell, 171 N.W. at 214. 
252. Linde, 159 N.W. at 284. 
253. Twichell, 171 N.W. at 214. 
254. Id.  On the same day, Robinson announced the decision to his readers, praising Grace’s 
and Birdzell’s opinions as “thoro [sic], conclusive and splendid,” while explaining, “My little 
short opinion was written long ago.”  See Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Oct. 5, 1918, 
at 2.  Some might think that the majority was premature in filing their opinions without awaiting 
the dissents.  Two factors supported prompt action.  Election regularity called for a prompt deci-
sion to facilitate the general election in early November.  Given the past abuse of collegiate cour-
tesy in delaying separate opinions for months, the decision of a majority to immediately file their 
controlling opinions was appropriate. 
255. State ex rel. Twichell v. Hall, 171 N.W. 213, 213 (N.D. 1918). 
256. Twichell, 171 N.W. at 224 (Birdzell,  J., concurring). 
257. Id. at 217-18 (majority opinion). 
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Christianson eventually filed an eleven-page dissent that mainly 
stressed the importance of stare decisis.258  In a one-page dissent, Bruce 
rebuked the majority for its failure to follow precedent, and personally 
attacked Robinson for having publicly expressed his views about Linde 
during his 1916 election campaign: 
It is no doubt true, as has been publicly stated by my Associate, 
Mr. Justice ROBINSON, that he, the said Justice, made a pre-
election promise to overrule the decision in the case of State ex rel. 
[Linde] v. Hall, supra, and that he would not have been elected if 
he had not done so, and it may be true, as asserted by Mr. Justice 
ROBINSON, that the secretary of state was conversant with this 
fact.  I have yet to learn, however, that the making of any such pre-
election promises were ever contemplated by the framers of our 
government, or that a show of force in the shape of a numerously 
signed petition should serve as a proper justification for a violation 
of my oath of office, and a reason why I should hold that to be the 
law which I do not believe to be the law.259 
After Bruce filed his dissent on January 28, 1919, Robinson claimed 
Bruce’s accusation was “not exactly true.”260  Robinson explained: 
It is said that at the last general election Justice Robinson obtained 
his great majority of 63,000 votes by promising to reverse the 
decision against the right of the people to amend the constitution, 
but that is a sorry compliment for the decision which has been 
reversed, and it is not exactly true.  Robinson made no promises, 
except to use his best efforts to put a stop to the law’s delays, and 
thus far he has met [this goal] with little success.261 
 
258. Id. at 234-45.  Six separate opinions were filed.  The three majority opinions were filed 
on October 5, 1918, but Christianson’s full dissent was not filed until January 28, 1919.  Id. at 
213.  Then, Birdzell filed a three-page addendum, responding to some of Christianson’s remarks.  
Robinson’s one-page concurrence and Bruce’s one-page dissent were the shortest.  Id. at 232-34.  
Grace wrote nearly seven pages in his opinion for the court and Birdzell’s concurrence ran nearly 
nine pages.  Id. at 214-30 (offering concurrences and dissents). 
259. Twichell, 171 N.W. at 234 (Bruce, J., dissenting) (italics added). Without naming 
Robinson, Bruce had begun this attack several months before in an address, entitled “A 
Government by Men and Not by Law,” to the Judiciary Section of the American Bar Association 
at its annual meeting.  See 1918 A.B.A. ANN. MEETING REP. 495-500 (containing Bruce’s 
address).  “How many [landowners] would really approve of a judge, or rather a candidate for a 
judicial office, doing what was done in North Dakota, and that is going before a political 
convention and promising that if elected he would construe the law and the constitutions as these 
conventions desire?”  Id. at 497. 
260. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 12, 1918, at 5. 
261. Id. 
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Bruce cited no source for his assertion about Robinson’s promises, but 
Bruce later insisted Robinson “candidly admitted from the bench [during 
oral argument] that he had made pre-election promises.”262 
Interestingly, Bruce did not accuse Grace or Birdzell of misconduct, 
although the League surely understood they too believed Linde had been 
wrongly decided.  Apparently, they had been more discreet. 
Bruce cited no precedent for his charge of unethical conduct by 
Robinson, but reasoned simply “that the making of any such pre-election 
promises were [n]ever contemplated by the framers of our govern-
ment . . . .”263  Bruce did not identify a specific regulatory or statutory 
restraint.  Nor did he consider the constitutional right of free speech.264 
Robinson’s alleged “pre-election promise to overrule” Linde would 
violate current standards of judicial conduct prohibiting “pledges or 
promises.”265  Today, such a promise would present a clear post-White case 
for the United States Supreme Court to decide whether a “pledges or 
promises” clause restraining the speech of candidates for judicial office 
violates the First Amendment.  We think such a challenge is likely and may 
very well succeed. 
Bruce did not seek re-election in 1918, so his personal attack on 
Robinson in his Twichell dissent had no effect on Bruce’s judicial career.  
One might wonder if he chose not to run out of frustration with Robinson’s 
criticism.266  More likely, Bruce anticipated the political trend of the 1918 
election and realized he had little hope of re-election, particularly in the 
face of Robinson’s public criticisms of his absences and poor 
 
262. BRUCE, supra note 44, at 68. 
263.  State ex rel. Twichell v. Hall, 171 N.W. 213, 213 (N.D. 1918). 
264. “Every man may freely write, speak and publish his opinion on all subjects, being 
responsible for the abuse of that privilege.” N.D. CONST. of art I, § 9 (renumbered as art. I, § 4). 
This clause is now found in art. I, § 4, unchanged.  N.D. CONST. art. I, § 4.  The First Amendment 
right to Freedom of Speech had not yet been applied to limit state action.  16A AM. JUR. 2D 
Constitutional Law §§ 401-406 (1998). 
265. “[A] candidate for judicial office shall not: (i) make pledges or promises of conduct in 
office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office.”  N.D. CODE OF 
JUD. CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d) (2002). 
266. Later, in a national review of Bruce’s book, Non-Partisan League, a reviewer concluded 
Bruce “resigned on account of the non-judicial attitude of his Socialist colleagues.”  A.M. Kidd, 
Book Review: Non-Partisan League, 10 CAL. L. REV. 269 (1922) [hereinafter Kidd, Book Review].  
This assertion was made without attribution to Bruce.  Id.  It apparently represented the reviewer’s 
inference from Bruce’s polemic about the “socialistic” League having endorsed and elected 
Robinson and two colleagues.  Id.  We question whether Bruce made a fair case to condemn Grace 
and Birdzell as “non-judicial,” let alone a satisfactory one against Robinson on his whole record.  
To do so, Bruce would have had to justify his own lackadaisical performance, overstuffed 
opinions, and lack of diligence. 
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performance.267  Bruce did not even serve out his term; he resigned on 
December 1, 1918, to return to teaching law.268 
Apparently no one sought to impeach Robinson for malfeasance in 
office.269  Even if someone thought of it, the political realities stood against 
it; the Non-Partisan League controlled both houses of the state legislature in 
the 1919 session, although its opposition regained control of the legislature 
in the 1920 general election.270  It is unlikely Robinson could have been im-
peached while the Non-Partisan League remained a strong force in the 
legislature. 
Still, Robinson’s vice of publicly discussing pending cases resulted in 
censure shortly after Bruce left the Court.  At its 1919 annual meeting, the 
State Bar Association of North Dakota “condemned” Robinson’s premature 
publication of his views.  The State Bar “place[d] upon the record the con-
demnation of this association, of the unethical acts of one of the judges of 
the supreme court, in publishing his opinions in the newspapers, long before 
the case is decided and before the official opinion of the court is filed in 
regular form.”271  The Bar’s resolution did not identify Robinson by name, 
but it was plainly aimed only at his “unethical acts.”272 
I. ROBINSON’S RESULTS 
After Justice Bronson was elected in November 1918, and shortly 
before Bruce resigned, Robinson wrote his most caustic lecture yet on his 
colleagues’ absences: 
 
267. “In the elections of 1918 the farmers stormed the last stronghold of the conservatives as 
three-fourths of the senate became League.”  LLOYD B. OMDAHL, INSURGENTS 16 (Lakeland 
Color Press 1961).  According to the 1919 Legislative Manual, Bruce’s successor, Harrison A. 
Bronson, another UND law professor, obtained the “endorsement of the Nonpartisan League and 
of Organized Labor” and then won election in November 1918.  See NORTH DAKOTA BLUE 
BOOK, supra note 116, at 558 (containing 1919 Legislative Manual). 
268. See Meschke & Smith, supra note 3, at 246 n. 187, and 307 (App. A). 
269. N.D. CONST. of 1889 art. XIV, § 196 (renumbered in 1980 to N.D. CONST. art. XI, 
§10): “The governor and other state and judicial officers . . . shall be liable to impeachment for 
habitual drunkenness, crimes, corrupt conduct, or malfeasance or misdemeanor in office, but 
judgment in such cases shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to 
hold any office of trust or profit under the state.” 
270. The 1919 Senate had 45 Republican and 5 Democratic members; the House 94 Republi-
can and 19 Democratic members. See NORTH DAKOTA BLUE BOOK, supra note 116, at 558 
(containing 1919 Legislative Manual at 198h-198m).  The League filed its candidates in the 
Republican column in those days. 
271. See Meschke & Smith, supra note 3, at 246. 
272. Two years after the State Bar Association of North Dakota censured Robinson, a paral-
lel judicial censure took place at the national level.  In August 1921, the American Bar Associa-
tion annual assembly endorsed a resolution of “unqualified condemnation” of “the conduct of 
Kenesaw M. Landis in engaging in private employment [as Baseball Commissioner] and accept-
ing private emolument while holding the position of a Federal Judge and receiving a salary from 
the federal government. . . .”  7 A.B.A.J. 477 (1921). 
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[W]e have now on the court calendar 144 appeals awaiting 
arguments and 36 cases long since argued and submitted—some of 
them over a year  ago.  This shows we need some better timber, 
better management and better court rules. 
. . . Bronson has faithfully promised to be at his chambers or in the 
court rooms of the Capitol and at work on each business day from 
nine a.m. to five p.m., the same as the writer. 
* * * * 
We have not fairly attempted to administer justice without delay, 
in accordance with our oath and the mandate of the constitution.  
Indeed, we have not yet commenced the work of judicial reform.  
As a rule, our judges follow the old custom of doing their work or 
leaving it undone.  They come and go as they please and show no 
regard for time.  During about one-third of the business days they 
are absent from their chambers and from the capitol.  During the 
past two months our Chief Justice has not been at the capitol more 
than four or five days.  And our Justice Grace—his presence at 
court is an occasion for rejoicing.  Our Justice Birdzell has been 
giving a large part of his time to a side job, as a member of the 
draft exemption board.  Now he realizes that the duties of the court 
demand all his time and thought and that no man can serve two 
masters, and he promises to decline all side jobs.273 
As this lecture reflected, the Court’s backlog of 150 pending appeals in 
January 1917, had grown to 180 by November 1918.  Robinson saw no 
progress despite his persistent prodding. 
After Bruce left on December 1, 1918, Christianson became Chief 
Justice.274  Yet the Court was clearly “Robinson’s Court” from his stren-
uous and strident campaign to improve it. 
Soon after Bruce resigned, Robinson wrote hopefully: 
With the advent of Justice Bronson and our new chief justice, our 
court has turned a new leaf.  During this week every judge has re 
ported for duty promptly at nine a.m.  We have set out in good 
earnest to catch up and keep up with the work of the court and to 
administer justice without denial or delay.275 
 
273. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Nov. 16, 1918, at 4. 
274. The Constitution then required rotation of the Chief position to the justice next up for 
re-election.  See Meschke & Smith, supra note 3, at 286-87 (explaining the history of electing of 
the Chief Justice). 
275. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Dec. 7, 1918, at 4. 
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Given Robinson’s constant publicity about their attendance, he may have 
expected the justices would gradually choose to arrive promptly every 
day.276 
Robinson was disappointed.  In February 1919, he reported: 
This week I regret to give our judges a black mark for absence 
without leave: Birdzell, J., one day; Bronson, J., two days; Grace, 
J., three days.  The result is that the work lags behind and is 
doubled by delays, and yet by the constitution the judge is bound 
to administer justice without denial or delay and he swears to do 
his duty faithfully and not indifferently.  In time, of course, there 
must be a change.  The judges are public servants, and when they 
serve[,] the state must learn[] to give all their time to the work and 
to do it as faithfully as if the work were done for any other 
corporation.  But it is hard to get out of the bad habit which has so 
long prevailed and which still continues to prevail in every state.277 
Robinson persisted. 
Robinson’s Court may have hired the first law clerk in the history of 
the Court.  A Robinson Letter in early 1919 sought applications for this job 
description: 
[T]he supreme court has for some one a nice plum—a position of 
$2,500 a year as law librarian, court reporter and court briefer.  To 
get the place one must show that he will gladly give all his time to 
the work, care well for the library, brief up and present to the 
judges the law on any question.  In short, he must be a worker of 
ability and capacity, of clear mental vision and about as smart as 
chain lightning.278 
In our experience, many of the law clerks and staff lawyers hired by the 
Court since have fulfilled those high expectations. 
The 1919 legislature authorized the Supreme Court to make rules of 
pleading, practice and procedure.279  Robinson explained three new rules 
the Court then adopted “which serve to expedite the business:” 
 
275. Through 1918, The Bismarck Tribune published Robinson’s Letters nearly every week.  
But beginning in 1919, its publication of his Letters became more sporadic.  It is not clear if 
Robinson wrote fewer Letters or if The Tribune concluded they were no longer all newsworthy.  
Furthermore, his Saturday Evening Letters were not always published on Saturday, nor on the 
same page, so we may have overlooked some of them in our searches. 
276. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Feb. 22, 1919, at 4. 
278. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Mar. 8, 1919, at 4.  See generally NORTH 
DAKOTA CENTENNIAL BLUE BOOK 1889-1989 465 (1989) (noting that Joseph Coghlan was 
hired). 
279. See 1919 N.D. Laws 284, ch. 167, § 6 (codified as amended at N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-
02-08 (2004)). 
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(1) As each case is argued or submitted, it is automatically 
allocated to one of the judges to formulate and submit a tentative 
decision.  (Of course he should do it within two we[e]ks.).  (2) On 
every Tuesday and Friday at 3 p.m. the judges meet in conference 
on pending cases, and those who agree upon a decision sign it.  (3) 
When a decision is signed by a majority of the judges, if one or 
more fail to concur or dissent, then it is filed with the clerk of the 
court for a concurrence or dissent to be given within ten days.  
Thus when a majority of the Court agree upon a decision, the other 
judges can no longer hold up the case indefinitely; within ten days 
they must fish or cut bait.  I give Justice Grace the credit of 
suggesting those rules.280 
Robinson was making some progress. 
By mid-May 1919, Robinson was optimistic that “in June we must hear 
and decide thirty cases, and that will clear the court calendar.”281  While 
Robinson felt “[s]ome judges are still prone to write long-winded decisions 
of ten or more pages,” he believed “the decisions show a marked improve-
ment and promise soon to compare well with those of the U.S. Supreme 
Court.”282 
By mid-June 1919, Robinson became even more optimistic about 
clearing the backlog: 
When we dispose of [forty-five pending] cases, as we hope to do 
early in July, it will clear the calendar.  The Court will be right up 
with its work for the first time in a score of years.  Then it will be 
in order to take a day of rejoicing and a summer vacation.283 
Robinson was getting results. 
Justice Bronson later explained how the Court implemented new rules: 
Commencing in January, 1919, . . . rules of the Supreme Court, 
from time to time, have been adopted and these, in connection 
with the later additional authority granted to the Supreme Court, 
pursuant to legislative act, have made a substantial change in 
method of presenting, hearing and determining causes upon 
appeals before this Supreme Court. 
* * * * 
 
280. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., May 17, 1919, at 4. 
281. Id. 
282. Id. 
283. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., June 7, 1919, at 4. 
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For a period of approximately six months [before July 1920] the 
Supreme Court of this state has been entirely up with its calendar.  
This is termed a novel situation in the history of appellate 
procedure in this state.284 
After detailing the rule changes “proposed by Justice Grace, and 
unanimously adopted by this Court,”285 Bronson described what the new 
procedures had brought about: 
In 1919 the Supreme Court considered and determined about 275 
cases, including original actions.  It is readily observed that there 
has been an actual reduction of judicial delay under the new pro-
cedure, whether the matter be viewed from the delay occasioned 
by attorneys in bringing a record on appeal at issue, the delay of 
the Court in bringing the same on for argument or the delay of the 
Court in actual disposing of the cause after argument.286 
So by July 1920, a year and a half after the Court had shed Bruce, 
Robinson proudly trumpeted: 
This letter should commence with a big Democratic rooster well 
disposed to crow long and loud over the achievements of our 
Supreme Court.  It is no[] idle boast to say that our court is now 
right up with its work and that no motion or appeal remains 
undecided.  Nothing is left undone.287 
Robinson’s emphasis on concerted effort finally brought results. 
Robinson fully credited his colleagues for the adoption of progressive 
procedures: 
New, progressive court rules, formulated by Justice Bronson, have 
been adopted.  To secure justice without denial or delay, there will 
be regular terms of court commencing on the first Tuesday in each 
month, excepting July and August, which are vacation months, 
when there is no pending court business.288 
In the end, Robinson largely achieved the reforms he had vigorously 
promoted from his first day on the Court. 
 
284. H.A. Bronson, The Law’s Delays in Appellate Procedure, 91 CENT. L.J. 83, 85-86 
(1920). 
285. Id. at 86. 
286. Id. at 87. 
287. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., July 3, 1920, at 4.  A few months earlier, 
Robinson had tentatively predicted victory: “Now, for the first time in twenty years, our court is 
right up with their work.  The last [old] case has been finally decided.  The slate is clear and 
suitors may get justice while they wait.” Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Feb. 23, 
1920, at 4. 
288. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., July 3, 1920, at 4. 
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Robinson declared, “The system [now] gives hope and promise of fair 
justice without denial or delay.”289  He compared the old system with the 
new: 
Under the former system judicial courtesy was carried to [the] 
limit of absurdity.  It was not in good form for one judge to write 
and submit a tentative decision in a case not assigned to him by the 
Chief Justice, nor to press any case to a final decision until each 
judge consented.  But now, under a splendid rule, formulated by 
Justice Grace, each judge writes and submits an opinion in every 
fifth case, which falls to him automatically.  Twice a week the 
judges meet in conference and when a majority sign a decision it is 
filed with the clerk so that within ten days the judges not signing 
may concur or dissent or call a conference; but within the time 
limit of ten days the dissenting judges, if any, must “fish or cut 
bait.”  That is good business.290 
Robinson finally had the efficient, businesslike system he had 
championed.291 
While things were improving, Robinson occasionally had to caution his 
colleagues about unexcused absences: 
Of late I have not been reporting the absences of our judges, but I 
must commence again—and must give Justice Bronson twenty 
black marks for long continued absences without leave.  On every 
day during business hours the honest duty of every judge and of 
every state officer is to be at his place in the capitol.292 
 
289. Id. 
290. Id. 
291. The Court has kept it.  Although not reflected in its written rules, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court still employs the tradition of automatically assigning each justice to write and 
submit a proposed opinion in each fifth case. 
292. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Jan. 26, 1920, at 4.  See also Saturday 
Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Apr. 12, 1920, at 4 (“Mr. Justice Bronson, I think, he was 
elected on condition that during the business hours of each day he would give all his time to the 
duties of his office.  Will he confess and try to excuse his frequent and long continuing absences 
from court for one-third of his time?”)  Robinson’s latter criticism prompted an anonymous letter 
to the editor of The Bismarck Tribune asserting that Bronson was “a great worker” and “that he 
attends strictly to work at all times and can do fifty per cent [sic] more work than Judge 
Robinson.” Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Apr. 24, 1920, at 4.  Robinson’s reply 
agreed Bronson was “a great worker,” but insisted: 
Judge Bronson had been for three weeks continuously absent from court, and . . . his 
absence for one, two or three weeks had grown to be rather common.  To do the work 
of the court as it should be done, it is necessary for every judge to be at his post of 
duty in the Capitol during the business hours of each day, and as a judge is a public 
servant, sworn to do his duty faithfully, he is not at liberty to leave his post of duty, 
and to go and come as he may please. 
       
74 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 82:25 
In September 1921, Grace published a national article to show off his 
Court’s success with its new and efficient procedures.293  Grace declared 
“[t]he result of operating under this procedure has been to eliminate delay 
and to bring the work of this Court entirely up . . . .”294  Grace said, “at the 
expiration of each month, there remain no undetermined nor undecided 
cases.  In other words, we have a term of court, commencing on the first 
Tuesday of each month, at which all cases on the calendar must be argued 
and submitted.”295 
Grace reviewed the old process and outlined the “substance” of the 
new rules and procedures.  As soon as a draft opinion is signed by three 
justices, it is filed with the clerk “and if not signed by or dissented from by 
the other two members within ten days, it becomes the decision in the 
case.”296  Grace touted another rule that scheduled conferences auto-
matically at three o’clock on Tuesday and Friday of each week.297  Grace 
explained at length the advantages of the procedure that automatically 
assigned cases in equal numbers to each justice to “distribute[] the work 
evenly.”298  Grace also discussed the rule change that required the appel-
lant’s brief to be filed at or before filing the record, with the appellee’s brief 
due in fifteen days.299 
Grace listed a number of advantages to the more efficient procedures: 
“saving of a vast amount of money, which is otherwise lost by the delays of 
the law”; “it does not delay justice”; “prevention of appeals taken solely for 
delay”; and “great saving[s] to litigants.”300 
Grace concluded with a discussion of the proper role of stare decisis 
that sounded remarkably like Robinson had written it.  Thus: 
The Judges of Appellate Courts should not always have their faces 
turned towards the past.  In other words, should not always be 
guided in their decisions, figuratively speaking, by the hands of the 
dead. In this day and age, they should, a good part of the time at 
least, have their faces toward the future.  The age in which we live 
 
Id. 
293. Richard H. Grace, The Law’s Delays and Who is to Blame, 93 CENT. L.J. 42 (1921).  
His article was soon republished in 5 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 114 (1921). 
294. Id. at 42. 
295. Id. 
296. Id. at 44. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. 
299. Id. at 46. 
300. Id. at 47. 
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is far different in many respects than that of fifty years, a century, 
or five centuries ago.301 
In his final paragraph, Grace echoed one of Robinson’s main themes: 
“Courts should not forget that they are the servants of the people . . . .”302 
Bronson, Bruce’s replacement, became active in the American Bar 
Association like his predecessor.  Bronson carried Robinson’s ideas about 
judicial efficiency to a 1922 Judicial Section meeting of the Association.  
Bronson moved: 
the Executive Committee of the Section be requested to include in 
the program of the next annual meeting of the Section a sympo-
sium devoted to the subject of prevention of delays in appellate 
procedure, embracing (1) some methods of speeding up delays in 
appellate procedure, (2) rendition of judicial opinions, and (3) 
consideration of rules of court in the administration of justice in 
appellate courts.303 
The motion passed.  Robinson’s ideas for improving judicial administration 
had found a national forum. 
Robinson had succeeded in shaping a model court. 
VI. ROBINSON’S NATIONAL NOTORIETY 
A. CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL: BRUCE’S ATTACK 
Shortly after Bruce left the Court, he carried his attack on Robinson to 
another level.  In early 1919, he wrote an eight-page article, Judicial 
Buncombe in North Dakota and Other States, published in a national law 
journal at St. Louis.304  The publisher’s note explained: “This article, by a 
former Chief Justice of North Dakota, is interesting as affording a peep 
behind the scenes.”305 
Bruce’s article criticized Robinson for the brevity of his opinions, for 
another alleged campaign promise “to decide cases on the argument without 
opinions and without leaving the courtroom,” and for having sometimes 
 
301. Id. at 48. 
302. Id. 
303. John T. Tucker, Proceedings of the Judicial Section, 1922 A.B.A. ANN. MEETING REP. 
457-58. 
304. Andrew A. Bruce, Judicial Buncombe in North Dakota and Other States, 88 CENT. L.J. 
136-43 (1919).  Before his 1911 appointment to the North Dakota Supreme Court, Bruce had 
served as an “associate editor” of the Central Law Journal.  See PROCEEDINGS 1911, supra note 
46, at 4. 
305. See Foreword to Andrew A. Bruce, Judicial Buncombe in North Dakota and Other 
States 88 CENT. L.J. at 136 (prefacing Bruce’s article). 
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“come into court with an opinion already written before counsel have even 
been heard from.”306 
Bruce condemned Robinson’s brand of brevity: “Mr. Justice Robinson, 
as a general rule, cites and reads no cases, he announces no definite rules of 
law.  His opinions furnish no guide to attorneys or to the public in subse-
quent controversies.”307 
However, the Supreme Court’s present Rule 35.1, within the North 
Dakota Rules of Appellate Procedure,308 authorizes “summary dispositions” 
of routine cases without citation of precedents.  Thus, Bruce has largely lost 
this argument.  The hydraulic pressure of an increasing number of appeals 
in the pipeline to an often-overloaded appellate court has impelled further 
terseness.  Still, Bruce’s views should caution modern appellate courts to 
carefully confine summary decisions to cases without any new or complex 
legal question. 
Justice Bruce also complained: “Every Saturday night he publishes a 
letter in the newspapers in which he prints these alleged opinions, and often 
before they have even been read by the other members of the court.”309  
Bruce cited four cases with voluminous records and briefs as examples that 
“required weeks of careful study,” and he deplored the complicating and 
misleading effects of Robinson’s premature and simplistic public com-
ments.310  As we noted earlier, Bruce was rightly indignant about this un-
agreed and unprecedented procedure, despite the lack of any available 
disciplinary mechanism to constrain Robinson’s premature public dis-
cussion of pending cases. 
B. CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL: ROBINSON’S RESPONSE 
The Central Law Journal invited Robinson “to explain his point of 
view” in the following week’s edition.311  In less than a page and a half 
captioned, “Peculiarities” in The Administration of Justice in North 
Dakota—Justice Robinson’s Explanation, he answered six questions from 
the editors: 
We called attention to the charge, first, that he lowered the dignity 
of the court; second, that he insisted on decisions being made with-
out argument and due consideration; third, that he gave a “weekly 
 
306. Bruce, supra note 304, at 136. 
307. Id. at 137. 
308. See N.D. R. APP. R. 35.1.  The rule, first adopted for affirmances by summary opinion 
in 1986, was amended to include reversals by summary opinion in 1998.  Id. at Explanatory Note. 
309.  Bruce, supra note 304, at 136. 
310. Id at 137. 
311.  Robinson, supra note 208, at 155-57. 
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letter” to the press calling attention to the delinquencies of other 
members of the court; fourth, that he favored oral opinions; fifth, 
that he totally ignored the rule of stare decisis and assumed to 
decide every case according to the justice of the particular case and 
not according to the law established by any preceding decision; 
sixth, that he sometimes wrote his opinion deciding a case before 
argument and notified attorneys in advance of his decision.312 
Robinson’s reply was characteristically concise.313 
On degrading the dignity of the Court, he acknowledged, “It is true that 
in many ways I am peculiar,” but, he explained, “my purpose has been to 
get the Court out of the old ruts of the law and to administer justice in a 
plain, common-sense and businesslike manner.”314  To explain how he jus-
tified “the writing of an opinion before hearing the argument of counsel,” 
Robinson said he did so “only in rare and plain cases.”315 
Occasionally, when looking over the record in advance of the 
debates, when it appears that the case is clear beyond reasonable 
dispute, I formulate a concise tentative opinion and mail a copy to 
the attorneys for each party and save them the expense of a trip to 
Bismarck if they concur in the opinion . . . .  [T]here is no law to 
prevent an appellate court deciding an appeal without oral argu-
ment, and in small cases, it is common to deny oral argument.316 
Robinson summarized his oft-repeated views on judicial efficiency: 
The oral debate of counsel is far from being desirable in all cases.  
It is often a great waste of time and a cause of needless delay and 
expense and it often tends only to mislead the judges.  It is most 
beneficial, I think, when one or more of the judges have looked 
well into the case and are able to turn the debate into a conference 
and when the judges decide the case while it is fresh in their 
memory. 
The judges double their work by delaying it.  There is no reason 
why the United States Supreme Court or any appellate court 
should be three months behind with its work.  It is time for 
 
312. Id. at 155. 
313. Robinson’s response was also published by The Bismarck Tribune as one of his 
Saturday Evening Letters.  Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Feb. 11, 1919, at 4. 
314. Robinson, supra note 208, at 155. 
315. Id. at 156. 
316. Id. at 156-57. 
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appellate judges to get out of the old ruts and to be more 
peculiar.317 
His desire to limit oral argument was not fully realized until 2003 when the 
North Dakota Supreme Court amended its rules “to make clear that the 
court has discretion to determine whether oral argument should or should 
not be permitted.”318 
Robinson defended his practice of giving the press “a weekly report on 
the doings of the Court, the time that each judge is absent from the Court 
and his manner of writing decisions.”319  It was done “[t]o expedite the 
business of the Court . . . .”320  In this too, Robinson was ahead of his time 
with press releases to inform the public about the work of the Court.  This 
virtue was stained, however, by his lack of tact, bluntness, and premature 
disclosures. 
In his response, Robinson denied that he “oppose[d] the practice of 
writing decisions” or favored oral opinions.  He pointed out that the “State 
Constitution provides that every decision must be given in writing, with the 
reasons concisely stated, and signed by the judges—and of course that is the 
only proper practice.”321 
Justice Robinson carefully answered the charge that he appeared “to 
favor a decision of every case on its merits, without regard to former 
decisions.”322 
It is true that I have little regard for old, obsolete or erroneous 
decisions and prefer to decide every case in accordance with law, 
reason and justice.  I do never—like Pontius Pilate—wash my 
hands and blame the law or a precedent or party zeal for an unjust 
decision.  I do not believe in building error upon error . . . .  I am 
so peculiar as to believe in due process of law . . . .323 
Robinson, thus, affirmed stare decisis, but asserted a judicial obligation to 
analyze precedent for error.  Both the importance of precedent and the 
recurrent need to re-examine it are still universal values in our doctrines, 
even though reasonable persons sometimes differ on how to apply them. 
 
317. Id. at 157. 
318. N.D. R. App. P. 34 Explanatory Note (2003). 
319. Robinson, supra note 208, at 156. 
320. Id. 
321. Id. 
322. Id. 
323. Id. 
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C. HARVARD LAW REVIEW NOTE 
After the exchange of articles between Bruce and Robinson in the 
Central Law Journal, several national law reviews examined Robinson’s 
reform-minded views.  His prophecies captured the attention of the Harvard 
Law Review. 
In 1920, the Harvard Law Review published an unsigned four-page 
Note on Rule and Discretion in the Administration of Justice.324  It 
discussed one of Robinson’s main ideas for substantive judicial reform—
discarding or disregarding bad precedent.325 
The Note identified Robinson’s view as part of the growing twentieth-
century movement towards “legal realism” in reaction to nineteenth century 
courts’ . . . “unyielding . . . faith that justice must be administered in 
accordance with fixed rules, which could be applied by a rather mechanical 
process of logical reasoning to a given state of facts and made to produce an 
inevitable result.”326 
Besides describing the ensuing development of administrative tribunals 
to handle special problems, the Note identified another important part of the 
reaction to “mechanical” justice.  “[T]he ultimately satisfactory solution lies 
in overhauling and readjusting our legal machinery to meet the present 
social demands . . . .”327  “In this connection it is interesting to note the 
attempts at legal reform made by Mr. Justice James E. Robinson of the 
Supreme Court of North Dakota.”328 
Largely from the exchange between Bruce and Robinson in the Central 
Law Journal, the Harvard Law Review editors gathered Robinson disliked 
the rule of precedent because “[h]e rarely cite[d] authorities in his more 
recent opinions, and . . . express[ed] a preference for deciding ‘every case in 
accordance with law, reason and justice.’”329 
The Note analyzed a sampling of Robinson’s opinions. 
In Bovey-Shute Lumber Co. v. Farmers’ & Merchants’ Bank of 
Leeds,330  Robinson “dismissed in a few sentences and without citation of 
authority the contention of a banking corporation that a contract of guaranty 
 
324.  Note, Rule and Discretion in the Administration of Justice, 33 HARV. L. REV. 972 
(1920) [hereinafter Rule and Discretion]. 
325. Id. at 972. 
326. Id. 
327. Id. at 973. 
328. Id. 
329. Id. 
330. 173 N.W. 455 (N.D. 1919). 
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made by its cashier was ultra vires and void.”331  The Note criticized his 
opinion for failing to consider the interests of the depositors of the bank: 
The learned justice’s opinion shows clearly one of the chief 
dangers of “administrative” justice, of justice by discretion rather 
than of justice by rule, namely, the tendency to take snap judgment 
upon the basis of more obvious and pressing interests, to the 
neglect of those which are more subtle and far-reaching.  
Granting . . . the decision is supportable, the “reasoning” of the 
court should not have ignored the judicial experience of the past in 
solving the problem of ultra vires acts of banking corporations.332 
Considering the arcane shape of the doctrine of ultra vires in that era, the 
Note’s criticism may have been somewhat justified.333 
The Note questioned Robinson’s brevity in stating the facts in Froelich 
v. Northern Pacific Railway Co.,334 asserting his rundown was too abbre-
viated, since the per curiam opinion on rehearing gave a statement of facts 
twice as long as his.335 
The Note insisted “something far more important than saving print-
paper is involved in the court’s statement of the facts.”336 
A full, clear, and impartial statement of facts by the court is 
necessary in order that the legal profession and the public may 
determine whether the judge has decided the case in accordance 
with the law or in accordance with his individual caprice.  It is not 
only an important safeguard against the exercise of an arbitrary 
discretion by a court of last resort, but also an essential part of the 
decision as a precedent for future guidance.337 
This is excellent instruction on opinion writing.  The Note rightly criti-
cized Robinson’s extreme simplicity in this one case, but it failed to grasp 
that there was at least some value in Robinson’s consistent efforts at brevity 
in the face of an enormous backlog of undecided cases and the prevalence 
of overstuffed opinions. 
The more frequent vice in judicial opinions, we think, has been 
wordiness.  The Note could have suggested balanced cautions: “Full” does 
 
331. Rule and Discretion, supra note 324, at 973. 
332. Id. at 974. 
333. But today, any interest of depositors would have little relevance.  See 7A WILLIAM 
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334. 173 N.W. 822 (N.D. 1919). 
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not mean prolix or repetitious.  To be “clear,” an opinion’s statement of 
facts needs to be concise and coherent, as well as complete.  Complete 
means impartially framing the essential facts emphasized by the losing 
party, as well as those favoring the prevailing party. 
Indeed, when an appellate court does not fairly address relevant facts or 
germane arguments without explaining why, lawyers become skeptical both 
about the court’s competence and its impartiality. 
The Note correctly criticized Robinson’s inappropriate use of judicial 
notice for facts within his personal knowledge in his dissent in Ingmundson 
v. Midland Continental Railroad Co.338  The Note’s explanation is another 
primer on this aspect of opinion writing: 
Judicial justice implies a right to be heard, which in turn implies a 
right to be confronted with the facts upon which the tribunal relies 
in denying one’s claim, and to be given an opportunity to rebut 
them.  While an exception is made in the case of facts which are 
notorious, this does not extend to a judge’s personal observation of 
the particular facts of a case.  If the tribunal relies upon its own 
private knowledge, it in effect prejudges the [party’s] case and 
denies him “due process of law.” Here again the dangers of 
discretion untrammeled by rule are obvious.339 
Still, discretion is often vital in administering justice.  In his concur-
rence in Horton v. Wright, Barrett & Stilwell Co.,340 Robinson objected to 
the majority’s assertion that “[t]he rule of stare decisis is especially appli-
cable to decisions on matters of procedure and practice.”341  Robinson 
protested: “I do strenuously dissent to the building of error upon error.  I 
concur in the result, but not in the reasoning or the stare decisis.”342  The 
Note agreed with Robinson and credited his position: 
Mr. Justice Robinson’s methods sometimes find their appropriate 
field.  Thus, in questions of fact in divorce cases, and in questions 
of procedure, the exercise of judicial discretion, within broad 
limits such as “due process,” appears at its best . . . .  [I]f there is 
any field in which the doctrine of stare decisis is least important, it 
is in the field of procedure.  No man can acquire a vested right in 
his opponent’s procedural error.343 
 
338. 173 N.W. 752, 753 (N.D. 1919) 
339.  Rule and Discretion, supra note 324, at 975. 
340. 174 N.W. 67 (N.D. 1919). 
341. Horton, 174 N.W. at 67. 
342. Id. at 68. 
343. Rule and Discretion, supra note 324,  at 975. 
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The Note concluded with a cautious endorsement of legal reform, but 
criticized Robinson’s efforts as “haphazard attempts to break away from 
justice according to rule.”344 
Before rejecting utterly the experience of the past, legal reformers 
should make a careful study of the ends to be attained, and of the 
fields in which rule, or discretion, as the case may be, will con-
serve the most and sacrifice the least of the interests which the law 
has to secure.  Only thus can the courts follow “the path of the 
law.”345 
In other words, the Harvard Law Review editors felt Robinson was headed 
on the right “path” for reform, but doing so “haphazardly” without careful 
study. 
Robinson thus advocated some significant substantive reforms before their 
time.  Even though a pariah to his colleagues, Robinson was a real prophet 
of legal reforms.  
D. CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW ARTICLE 
In 1922, Professor Max Radin346 wrote an article recognizing 
Robinson’s place in America’s emergent movement for judicial reform.347  
The California Law Review published Radin’s eleven-page article on The 
Good Judge of Chateau-Thierry and His American Counterpart.348 
The French “Good Judge,” Radin explained, was M. Magnaud, presi-
dent of the tribunal at Chateau-Thierry between 1889 and 1904, who later 
became a deputy in Parlement.349  Magnaud became famous in France “for 
exercising his discretion in accordance with his conscience” and “his liberal 
 
344. Id. at 976. 
345. Id. 
346. Radin was a distinguished and liberal legal scholar.  He was a professor of law at the 
University of California Law School from 1919 to 1948.  A.M. Kidd, Max Radin, 38 CAL. L. 
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for the California Supreme Court because Warren thought Radin to be too liberal. Earl Warren, 
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wrote a tribute to Radin and his scholarship. William O. Douglas, Max Radin Tribute, 36 CAL. L. 
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political and social views.”350  “He scorned ‘legal law’ . . . and would be 
guided only by equity—not an altogether novel idea.”351 
According to Radin, “M. Magnaud scorned precedent . . . because it 
did not do justice in the specific case before him.  In this, he was justified 
by the principles of the system within which he worked, a system that never 
accepted stare decisis.”352  For these judicial traits, Radin reported, 
Magnaud became known as “le bon juge,” or “the Good Judge.”353 
The phenomena of “good judges,” Radin suggested, was “not unknown 
to the Anglo-American system, if by ‘good’ judges we mean those who 
have attempted, as freely as they could, to determine causes in accordance 
with their personal sympathies or personal conscience.”354  Radin recog-
nized “Mr. Justice James E. Robinson of North Dakota” as “such a judicial 
phenomenon.”355 
Radin thought the “recent judicial experiment in North Dakota ha[d] 
given us an episode strikingly similar in its tendencies and results to that of 
the work of Magnaud in France.”356  North Dakota’s “recent judicial experi-
ment” was electing “judges of the Non-Partisan League” to the state’s 
Supreme Court.357 
Radin described how Robinson reached the Court: “Elected in 1916 by 
an unprecedented majority, he took office on January 2, 1917, as a Non-
Partisan League partisan with the avowed intention of sweeping away the 
dry-rot of technicalities and precedents and deciding every case on the 
merits as they appeared in his conscience.”358 
Radin compared Robinson’s approach to Magnaud’s as having “a 
striking similarity between Mr. Robinson and M. Magnaud.  Both are ear-
nest; both immensely confident in their rectitude; both active politicians; 
both radical in their views and sympathies; both dislike lawyers; and both 
have scant awe for their colleagues.”359  “But,” Radin declared, “there the 
similarity ends.”360 
Based on his reading of several French accounts of “le bon juge,” 
Radin saw Magnaud as “much the more consistent and much more 
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consciously determined to carry out the principle that immediate justice 
must be done to the litigants, whatever statute or precedent say.”361 
Based on his sampling of twenty-four “prevailing, concurring, partially 
concurring, dissenting and partially dissenting opinions”362 by Robinson, 
Radin contrasted him unfavorably with his continental counterpart.  Radin 
denounced the shortcomings of Robinson’s style and the failings of his 
philosophy. 
Radin recognized Robinson frequently used precedents to support his 
opinions, although “in general, he cites fewer cases than his colleagues,” 
and concluded that “[o]ften his views are fully in accord with precedent—
and arbitrary technical precedent.”363  Indeed, “[a]s in the case of 
Magnaud,” Radin recognized, “much the larger number of Judge 
Robinson’s decisions, even when he supposes them to be violent departures 
from established rules, can be paralleled elsewhere.  His language is more 
violent and picturesque than that of other judges, but that is all.”364  Thus, 
Radin did not criticize Robinson for any lack of respect for precedents, only 
for not putting enough of them in his opinions. 
Radin deplored Robinson’s tendency to retry “issue[s] of fact without 
sight of the witnesses or renewed examination of them . . . even to the ex-
tent of raising points on appeal that [counsel] had never raised.”365  Radin 
condemned this as “an ancient and evil practise,” enjoined by an ancient 
Jewish maxim: “In the judge’s seat, act not the counsel’s part.”366 
Radin appropriately criticized a poor practice, but he failed to fathom 
the fault fell not on Robinson, but largely on a unique North Dakota appel-
late procedure fixed by statute. 
“Trial anew” review, sometimes called “trial de novo,” drawn from 
ancient Roman and ecclesiastical law, had been codified in North Dakota 
since 1893.367 
Though forcefully criticized by legal scholars and historians for 
decades, the entrenched practice of “trial anew” review prevailed until re-
pealed in 1971, over a half-century after Robinson’s time on the Court.368  
Still, Robinson shared some responsibility for Radin’s criticism of his 
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opinions by not citing the statutory source when he employed “trial anew” 
review in his opinions.369 
Radin thought some of “Judge Robinson’s announcements . . .  startling 
in form and unusual in substance,” but believed they were not “all mischie-
vous in tendency.”370  Radin complained about the “lucubrations” of one of 
Robinson’s longer opinions contrasted to the “terseness and directness of 
one of his earlier opinions,” approving particularly one four-sentence 
concurrence.371 
But “the real difficulty with Judge Robinson,” according to Radin, was 
use of his “great office to support and extend certain set political doct-
rines . . . in so flagrant or inconsistent a manner . . . .”372  For this con-
clusion, Radin relied mainly on the 1921 account of former Justice Bruce, 
in his book, Non-Partisan League.373  Radin also condemned Robinson’s 
spoken “conduct before election” as “gross violations of all canons in this 
regard.”374  Like Bruce’s criticisms, Radin specified no particular authori-
ties or canons. 
Radin also cited three 1921 opinions by Robinson in reproving his 
“gross violations of all canons”: “The most outrageous instance is Wilson v. 
City of Fargo,375 in which he sets aside explicit constitutional provisions 
with the contemptuous statement that the people had progressed consider-
ably since they ‘swallowed the constitution whole as the whale swallowed 
Jonah.’”376  Radin rebuked Robinson: “The direct partisan purpose of this 
decision, overladen with phrases of great moral earnestness, is indicated by 
the fact that on another occasion he denounced an act which violated the 
very constitutional safeguard he here sets aside.”377 
For this accusation, Radin does not cite Robinson’s prior inconsistent 
statement, but again relies on critical comments in Bruce’s book, Non-
Partisan League.378  Still, inconsistency can create uncertainty in the appli-
cation of the law.  Inconsistency is thus a judicial vice, even though nearly 
every judge commits that sin occasionally, often inadvertently. 
 
369. See Westerland v. First Nat’l bank of Carrington, 164 N.W. 323, 325-26 (N.D. 1917) 
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372. Radin, supra note 347, at 309. 
373. BRUCE, supra note 44, at 170. 
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86 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 82:25 
Civility of expression is a virtue.  Radin strongly criticized some of 
Robinson’s expressions as intemperate.  “[T]here seems no sufficient rea-
son why the language even of ‘good’ judges, should not be the language of 
a gentleman.”379 
Quoting Robinson’s colorful wording in several opinions, Radin 
complained: “It really is not necessary to say that the defendant was a 
‘goosie’ or a ‘sucker’ in order to do equity.”380  Radin characterized Robin-
son’s “reference to marital or sex relations” in another opinion as “not so 
much undignified as it is unpleasant.”381  Radin reprimanded Robinson with 
his own words: “In the conduct of a legal proceeding the rules of common 
courtesy must prevail.”382 
Radin ended his article by praising Magnaud as “a consistent and con-
scious radical,” while declaring Robinson, “would scarcely be recognized 
as a radical in France or even as a liberal.”383 
In fact he can be quoted for points of view that might be called 
reactionary and blindly conservative.  It is the veering inconsis-
tency in his practise, more than the vague looseness of his 
professions that make his “jurisprudence” an evil example.384 
We wonder, though, if condemnation of another’s less-disciplined views as 
an “evil example,” instead of a “poor example,” is not also an instance of 
incivility? 
E. CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW: THE BOOK REVIEW 
After he left the North Dakota Supreme Court in late 1918, Bruce 
returned to the University of North Dakota School of Law.385  Over the next 
few years, he wrote a 284-page book, Non-Partisan League.386  One part of 
that book was aimed directly at the North Dakota Supreme Court and at 
Robinson in particular.387  We discuss his book next in this article, but here 
we look at a two-page book review of it.388 
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The reviewer, A.M. Kidd,389 saw Bruce’s book as a “history of the 
Non-Partisan League in North Dakota” that would be “of much interest” to 
California readers because “the Socialists” were “now organizing a Non-
Partisan League in California.”390  Kidd regarded Bruce as an “unim-
peachable” source, apparently because he “was formerly [the] Chief Justice 
of North Dakota [who] resigned on account of the non-judicial attitude of 
his Socialist colleagues.”391  Because Bruce wrote “from the point of view 
of a Progressive-Republican” who had “fought the old machine boss rule 
and the economic abuses of which the people justly complained,” Kidd 
suggested, “the League is not likely to have a fairer opponent.”392 
Kidd tried to summarize the economic conditions that the League 
confronted and the League’s failings in two paragraphs, using only Bruce’s 
account.393  Kidd concluded: “Whatever the ultimate solution, it will not 
appeal to the sober sense of men to revert to primitive justice and abrogate 
the distinction between the executive and the judiciary.”394 
Kidd then sweepingly indicted the entire North Dakota Supreme Court 
based on Bruce’s accusations against Robinson: 
The Non-Partisan League judges have announced that they will 
not be bound by precedent.  They have opened up cases long after 
the time for appeal has gone by, and have publicly stated in 
advance how they are going to decide cases that may come up in 
the future for decision.  Their avowed purpose is to carry out the 
policies of the Non-Partisan League.395 
As we explain next, Bruce’s book accused Robinson of each of those sins.  
But, we think, Kidd uncritically expanded Bruce’s accusations to unfairly 
indict the entire North Dakota Supreme Court. 
VII. BRUCE’S BOOK: NON-PARTISAN LEAGUE 
Bruce’s book was a lengthy (29 chapters, 284 pages) polemic against 
the policies and politics of the League.  In chapter after chapter, Bruce 
assailed the League’s leadership as “socialistic,” its policies as “socialistic,” 
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and its administration of state government as bumbling.  Thus, Bruce 
charged: 
Its socialistic leadership is tolerated and its socialistic tendency is 
overlooked by the naturally conservative and (except where his 
own interests can be subserved) anti-socialist farmer, because he 
thinks that he sees in it the means of obtaining his present ends. 
* * * * 
As a political movement it is an attempt to . . . serve both as a 
present avenue to political power for its leaders and as an entering 
wedge for a communistic America.396 
For any recognition of a worthy aspect of the League’s early years, one 
has to read Bruce very closely.397 The following quotation was a back-
handed acknowledgement, nearly the only credit Bruce gave the League: 
Many of [the League’s] ideas, like those of the earlier populists, 
will remain in our permanent legislation.  The organization, how-
ever, must sooner or later fall to pieces, and this because there are 
no points of common interest between the farmer and the socialist, 
and the farmer and the laboring-man, save the one attempt to 
curtail the power of the middleman and the excessive power of 
organized capital, which no doubt will be accomplished, and 
which would have been accomplished if the League had never 
existed.398 
Bruce was right on one thing; many of the League’s ideas have survived 
and flourished as permanent legislation.  Notable successes include the 
State Mill and Elevator and the Bank of North Dakota. 
But Bruce badly misjudged the League’s staying power when he pre-
dicted that it “must sooner or later fall to pieces.”  Bruce would be surprised 
to learn that the League survived his aspersions of socialism and commu-
nism.  In the last fifty years, the Democratic-NPL alliance, created in 1956, 
has succeeded in electing many state officials, including three governors, 
three United States Senators, and five United States Congressmen.399 
 
396. BRUCE, supra note 44, at 4-5. 
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In an early chapter entitled The League and its Socialist Leadership,400 
Bruce gave his perception of the League’s campaign to elect members of 
the Supreme Court: 
The League members of the Supreme Court, from whom much 
was expected and much was obtained, were Richard H. Grace, 
Luther E. Birdzell, Harry Bronson and James E. Robinson.  These 
men were selected by William Lemke and their election was 
secured on the theory that they had committed themselves to the 
policies of the League.  During the argument in the Supreme Court 
of the case of State ex rel. Twichell v. Hall one of them, James E. 
Robinson, candidly admitted from the bench that he had made pre-
election promises.  During the campaign, also, Mr. Townley and 
other League orators frequently stated that the election of these 
Judges was of more importance to the success of the League 
program than even that of the governor himself; and this statement 
was reiterated in the League’s principal organ, The Nonpartisan 
Leader, and in other campaign publications.401 
Bruce thus condemned the League for choosing sympathetic candidates for 
the Court, endorsing them, and campaigning for them openly. 
For our purposes, the important part of Bruce’s book is chapter XIX, 
The League and the Courts.402  There, Bruce again damned Robinson for 
“openly [going] before the [League] convention and promis[ing] if elected 
to support its measures.”403  In doing so, Bruce recognized pledges were 
often expected of judicial candidates by some factions, but he expressed an 
odd preference for the process to remain behind closed doors: 
These things have perhaps been done secretly in the past, and it is 
no doubt true that the so-called vested interests have often taken a 
prominent part in the selection of what they have termed safe and 
sane judges who, they believed, would favor their social, constitu-
tional and economic views.404 
This attitude, we think, brands Bruce’s attack on Robinson as hypocritical 
and opportunistic—a way to get back at Robinson for his constant criticism 
of Bruce’s absences and inaction as Chief Justice. 
Bruce mentioned no precedent, standard, or statute that prohibited or 
penalized Robinson’s remarks to the League convention.  Instead, Bruce 
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based his censure on the generalized need for the public to see the courts as 
impartial and unbiased, claiming that “in order that there may be a stable 
government under the laws, the courts must be trusted, the courts must be 
respected, and in order to be respected they must themselves be respectable 
and respectful.”405  This conception has been central to regulating judicial 
conduct in most states since Bruce expressed it.  The first canon of the 
North Dakota Code of Judicial Conduct dictates, “A judge shall uphold the 
integrity and independence of the judiciary.”406 
To support his view that Robinson’s judicial behavior made him less 
than “respectable and respectful,” Bruce quoted the entirety of his own 
dissent in Twichell,407 and two complete Saturday Evening Letters to show 
how Robinson’s public statements compromised the Court. 
In an October 26, 1918, Letter, Robinson accused the North Dakota 
legislature of corruptly adopting a “bone-dry” (prohibition) act in its 1917 
session, and Robinson extolled the medicinal uses of alcohol.408  Bruce 
declared this, “in advance of any lawsuit testing the validity of the so-called 
bone-dry law of North Dakota, [was] by way of gratuitous advice to 
prospective litigants . . . .”409 
Although no action was then pending on the subject, Robinson acted 
indiscreetly to question the validity of a specific enactment unrelated to the 
judicial branch.  Today, it is clear, “A judge shall not, while a proceeding is 
pending or impending in any court, make any public comment that might 
reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness . . . .”410  
Further, “A judge shall conduct all of the judge’s extra-judicial activities so 
that they do not: (1) cast reasonable doubt on the judge’s capacity to act 
impartially as a judge; (2) demean the judicial office; or (3) interfere with 
the proper performance of judicial duties.”411  By today’s standards, 
Robinson’s remarks on prohibition “cast reasonable doubt on [his] capacity 
to act impartially” on any case involving prohibition.412 
 
405. Id. at 184. 
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A judge, who publicly comments on a potential case, would likely be 
required to recuse himself from that case.413  But a judge is entitled to speak 
out “concerning the law,” absent an imminent specific case.414 
Bruce quoted all of Robinson’s December 7, 1918, Letter,415 com-
menting dimly, “It is rarely in America that we find Supreme Court Justices 
writing to the press Letters such as that. . . .”416  Robinson’s Letter chortled 
and crowed about the recent election of Justice Bronson to Bruce’s seat. 
Robinson depicted Christianson as the “last rose of summer,” since he 
embodied “the last of the old line judges—the last of the Mohicans.”417  
Robinson gloated: “All his lovely companions are faded and gone and their 
places are filled by good Non-partisan judges.”418  Robinson also 
venture[d] to predict that the Non-partisan court will in efficiency 
and fairness far surpass any former court of the state; that they will 
not be slaves to any erroneous or rotten decisions called prece-
dents—and that in future no person will be deprived of life, liberty 
or property without due process of law.419 
Robinson’s personalized critique of former justices is a little startling to 
modern judges, accustomed to the decorum of modern collegiality. 
It is doubtful, however, this kind of criticism would bring disciplinary 
action under modern standards.  In defense of Robinson, judges are not 
beyond criticism of their performance.  Modern standards do not insulate 
judges from their critics, nor from each other.  And judges themselves are 
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not second-class citizens, unable to express their views on public figures or 
subjects. 
“A judge may speak, write, lecture, teach and participate in other extra-
judicial activities concerning the law, the legal system, the administration of 
justice and non-legal subjects, subject to the requirements of the Code.”420  
But public and personalized criticism of a colleague is certainly detrimental 
to efficient appellate processes. 
In the Letter that Bruce criticized, Robinson also praised and appraised 
each of his colleagues.  Bronson was a “pure-bred—a good worker and a 
thinker with a large bump of justice and a clear perception of the difference 
between right and wrong.”421  Grace was “of the right pedigree, a worker, 
and a jurist of luminous mind.”422  Robinson rated Birdzell “as a good half-
breed; while the old-liners made him law professor at the U and tax com-
missioner, Bishop Lemke virtually made him judge.”423 
Robinson spoke well of Christianson, too.  “He is a jurist of capacity 
and a real gentleman.  When left to his own good impulses he is sure to 
stand for the cause of right and justice.”424 
But Robinson said Christianson “on many occasions . . . has fallen into 
error by putting too much trust in his former companions.”425  Robinson 
discussed why he believed Christianson had voted wrong in some cases, 
except for one where, “at the third conference a light seemed to shine 
around the intellect of Judge Christianson as it shown around Paul on his 
way to Damascus to persecute the Christians.”426 
Robinson concluded expectantly: “But now under better influences it is 
hoped none of our judges will now feel inclined to continue piling error 
upon error by following the lead of decisions so manifestly erroneous or 
rotten.”427 
Bruce complained, in one of the cases that Robinson argued was 
wrongly decided, that Robinson had: 
carried on an active correspondence with the owner of the horses 
without the knowledge of the other parties to the litigation, and 
wrote several Letters to the press expressing his opinion of the 
case, and even published a tentative opinion.  This was done in 
 
420. N.D. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 4B. 
421. BRUCE, supra note 44, at 177. 
422. Id. 
423. Id. 
424. Id. 
425. Id. at 178. 
426. Id. 
427. Id. at 180. 
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order to bring public ridicule upon those of his associates who 
differed with him, and to compel them to concur in his view of the 
controversy.  This, indeed, has been the jurist’s common practice.  
Law suits to him should be tried by the public, and not the court, 
and the judges should be representatives and not the expounders of 
an established law.  To Justice Robinson it is perfectly fitting and 
proper for a judge to talk to the litigants and council [sic] pending 
a law suit or pending an appeal, and to even announce his decision 
in advance of the litigation.428 
Bruce, of course, was right on this.  The only proper way for a justice to ex-
press a different view about a case before the Court is in a separate opinion 
at the time of the final decision, either concurring or dissenting.  Any pre-
mature opinion is a serious impediment to impartial deliberations. 
Three years after Bruce’s book, the American Bar Association adopted 
its first recommended Standards of Judicial Conduct.429  The new standards 
contained directions that judicial candidates not make “promises of conduct 
in office” nor “announce his conclusions of law on disputed issues.”430 
In 1922, Bruce became a member of the law faculty at Northwestern 
University.431  In 1924, Bruce published another book, The American 
Judge.432  In 11 chapters and 212 pages, Bruce attempted “to throw some 
light on the problem[s of judicial administration], to present at least the 
issues, to explore perhaps some fallacies, and to discuss the limitations as 
well as the needs of a government of law among men.”433 
Bruce did not mention Robinson, but continued to name the Non-
Partisan League as a bad example of political control of a court system.434  
Yet Bruce’s essays reflected some of Robinson’s ideas, adopting some and 
still challenging others.  For example, Bruce recognized “excessive costs 
and . . . unnecessary delays close our courts to the average citizen, and even 
the business man foregoes many a right before he will go to law.”435 
 
428. Id. 
429. “The first code regulating judicial conduct was adopted by the ABA in 1924.”  
Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U. S. 765, 786 (2002) (citing 48 A.B.A. REPS. 74 (1923) 
(report of Chief Justice Taft); P. MCFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF 
JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS 86 (1990)). 
430. A.B.A. CANON OF JUD. ETHICS 30 (1924). 
431. 1935 Memoriam, supra note 46, at 166. 
432. ANDREW A. BRUCE, THE AMERICAN JUDGE (Richard T. Ely ed., The MacMillan Co. 
1924). 
433. Id. at 12. 
434. Id. at 148, 167. 
435. Id. at 117. 
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On the other hand, Bruce continued to argue against any abbreviated 
opinions.436  “It is easy for a judge to brush aside a case by saying it is ‘a 
kindergarten case’ and is not worthy of consideration.”437 
Curiously, Bruce moved to Robinson’s position on one aspect of stare 
decisis, a major subject of criticism by Bruce during their years together on 
the Court.  Bruce said, “[t]he fear of overruling previous decisions—a fear 
which the public by no means shares—has so paralyzed our courts as to 
render them at times almost ridiculous.”438 
While still teaching law at Northwestern University, Bruce served as 
chairman of the National Reconstruction Administration’s compliance 
board for Chicago.439  Bruce died of a heart attack at the age of 68 on 
December 7, 1934.440  Bruce and his books are barely remembered today.  
Bruce’s positions on judicial speech have been largely rejected by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in White.441  Judicial speech seems bound to be-
come as open and robust as in Robinson’s days. 
Still, Bruce’s conflicts with Robinson contributed a great deal to the 
shape of today’s judicial values. 
VIII. ROBINSON’S BOOK: WRONGS AND REMEDIES 
Robinson sought re-election in 1922.  Among his League-endorsed col-
leagues, Grace retired, and Birdzell sought re-election, too.442 
The political climate had changed since 1916.  The League suffered a 
serious setback in the nation’s first and, until 2003, only gubernatorial recall 
election in 1921.  Governor Frazer was recalled and Governor Nestos was 
elected in his place.443  The League still ran strong in the 1922 legislative 
races, but it was not as potent at the polls as in the three previous general 
elections.444 
 
436. Id. at 77-79. 
437. Id. at 77. 
438. Id. at 67.  But see id. at 181-82 (delivering wry comments about the Non-Partisan 
League Court’s lack of respect for precedent). 
439. 1935 Memoriam, supra note 46, at 166. 
440. Id. 
441. See generally Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
442. Meschke & Smith, supra note 3, at 246. 
443. Frazier had 107,332 (49%) votes and Nestos had 111,434 (51%).  NORTH DAKOTA 
VOTES, supra note 42, at 138. 
444. After the 1922 election, the Independents had 26 members in the Senate, compared to 
the League’s 23; the Independents had 58 in the House, compared to the League’s 55. 
Independents Win State Control, DEVILS LAKE WORLD, Nov. 15, 1922, at 1. 
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Robinson had alienated the League leadership.445  He often criticized 
the League publicly446 and in his Saturday Evening Letters.447  The 
League’s opponents used his criticisms to campaign against the League in 
1921.448 
Robinson entered the 1922 primary without the support of the League 
that he had enjoyed in 1916.  The League, at its March 1922 convention, 
endorsed Grace, M.J. Englert, a district court judge, and George E. Wallace, 
a former state tax commissioner.449  The Democratic and Republican 
conventions did not endorse candidates for the Supreme Court.450 
 
445. One publication reported Robinson “several times . . . proved a thorn in the flesh of the 
[League] leaders particularly when certain fundamental property rights were involved and Justice 
Robinson declined to sanction Socialistic assaults upon them.”  See ROBINSON, supra note 39, at 
282 (republishing an excerpt of an undated Duluth Herald article). 
446. Robinson’s trouble with the League began during his first month on the Court.  See 
Robinson Says Plan Proposed Will Not Work, BISMARCK TRIB., Jan. 15, 1917, at 1; Robinson is 
Thorn in the League’s Side, Jan. 17, 1917, at 3; Seeks to Save League Intact From Pitfalls, 
BISMARCK TRIB., Jan. 18, 1917, at 1. 
447. Just before the 1918 general election, Robinson publicly opposed seven of ten 
constitutional amendments that the League had promoted.  See Vote No on Amendment, J.E. 
Robinson, BISMARCK TRIB., Oct. 19, 1918, at 1 (publishing Letter as a news story under this 
banner: “Venerable League Associate Justice Raps Seven Out of Ten Proposals”).  In an 
introductory paragraph, The Bismarck Tribune observed Robinson’s “independence of thought 
and action have time and again been found disconcerting by the league managers.”  Id.  This same 
Letter appeared again in the Monday, October 21, 1918, edition of The Bismarck Tribune, in a 
full-page paid political advertisement by the Burleigh County Democratic Central Committee.  
Robinson did not oppose three proposed constitutional amendments, including the one on “Public 
Ownership of Industries.” James E. Robinson, Judge Robinson Says No!, BISMARCK TRIB., OCT. 
21, 1918, at 1. 
448. The Red Flame was “an anti-League monthly magazine that surfaced in November, 
1919, under the primary sponsorship of Carl Kositzky, and existed through the 12 months prior to 
the elections of 1920.”  ROBERT L. MORLAN, Foreword to THE RED FLAME: A CHRONICLE OF 
THE FIERCE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE EARLY DAYS OF NORTH DAKOTA’S NON-
PARTISAN LEAGUE (Lowe & Larson Printing, Inc. 1975).  In this republication, see attributions to, 
and quotations from, Justice Robinson.  THE RED FLAME: A CHRONICLE OF THE FIERCE 
CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING THE EARLY DAYS OF NORTH DAKOTA’S NON-PARTISAN LEAGUE 
50, 52, 55-57, 58, 88, 181 (Lowe & Larson Printing, Inc. 1975). “It was Judge Robinson of the 
North Dakota supreme court, we believe, who took upon his own shoulders full responsibility for 
the reign of socialism which North Dakota is now experiencing, this venerable league justice 
declaring that in an unfortunate moment he placed in the hands of A.C. Townley a copy of Walter 
Thomas Mill’s book [The Struggle for Existence].” Id.  at 227. 
449. League Places a Full Ticket in the Field, BISMARCK TRIB., Mar. 27, 1922, at 1, 3.  The 
Bismarck Tribune account says five names were placed into nomination: A.G. Burr finished fourth 
in the balloting and the fifth person was not named.  Id. at 3.  Therefore neither Birdzell nor 
Robinson received the League’s endorsement.  We have found no explanation why Birdzell lost 
the League’s favor.  Grace declined the nomination, having decided to go back into law practice.  
Justice Grace to Retire from Supreme Court, BISMARCK TRIB., Mar. 30, 1922, at 1.  Wallace later 
withdrew from the race after accepting a job in New York.  Wallace Takes Position with Western 
Union, BISMARCK TRIB., May 29, 1922, at 3. 
450. Conventions Adjourned at Noon Today without Action on Senator Issue; “Fusion” on 
State Ticket, BISMARCK TRIB., Apr. 20, 1922, at 1. 
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Robinson announced that he had filed for re-election in a Letter 
published by The Bismarck Tribune on May 13, 1922.  He quoted from his 
Publicity Pamphlet statements for his 1912 campaign for Congress and his 
1916 campaign for the Court that marked his reform-minded views.  He 
next summarized what he had accomplished:  
Now, as a result of those Letters, and of persistent work by some 
person, the laws delays and the compulsory expense of printing 
briefs and court records may be accounted a thing of the past.  A 
suitor does not have to buy justice or to wait years for a decision.  
At a small expense a party may appeal to our Supreme Court, and 
obtain a final decision within a month.451 
Robinson’s one-page statement in the 1922 Publicity Pamphlet similarly 
claimed credit for various changes: 
In 1919 [Robinson] drafted and secured the passage of three acts 
of great benefit to the poor debtors: (1) An act limiting and re-
ducing the costs of foreclosures. (2) An act providing for notice of 
thirty days before commencing a foreclosure. (3) An act giving 
debtors the use of their property during the year of redemption.452 
Robinson claimed credit for circulating an initiated measure to reduce taxes 
by repealing certain tax measures enacted in 1919.453  Also: 
[Robinson] is the first judge in all the world to give the press a 
weekly letter on the court procedure, the law’s delays, the number 
of pending cases, the absence or offdays of each judge.  Result: 
Monthly terms of court, no expense of printing, shorter and better 
decisions, no more delays, no more pawing over cases for a year, 
no judge lays off until his work is done.454 
While his claimed successes were largely true, the voting public was not 
impressed. 
Eleven candidates ran for six nominations for three Supreme Court 
positions in the 1922 primary election.455  Robinson finished ninth, garner-
ing only 30,580 votes, and so was eliminated in the primary.456  Birdzell ran 
 
451. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., May 13, 1922, at 4. 
452. James E. Robinson, in N.D. PUBLICITY PAMPHLET 7 (Bismarck Tribune Company 
1922) (issued under authority of law by Thomas Hall, Sec’y of State, Bismarck, North Dakota) 
(providing statements of the candidates for the primary election on June 22, 1922). 
453. Id. 
454. Id. 
455. 68 Candidates Go on Ballot for Nomination in June Primaries of Republican and 
Democratic Parties, BISMARCK TRIB., May 30, 1922, at 6. 
456. NORTH DAKOTA VOTES, supra note 42, at 90. 
       
2006] JUDICIAL VALUES 97 
fifth in the primary, but he finished in the top three in the fall to gain 
election, along with William Nuessle and Sveinbjorn Johnson, neither of 
whom was supported by the League.457 
Nearing age 80, Robinson was thus involuntarily retired.  As he had 
promised in a 1917 Letter,458 he soon published his book, Wrongs and 
Remedies: Economic Live Wire Essays.459 
Robinson’s book was a jumble of short essays on varied topics in no 
particular order.  The book had 32 chapters, a conclusion, and two short 
appendices in 301 pages.  Many of the chapters were republications of one 
or more of his Saturday Evening Letters.460  Chapter X, for example, had 
six parts, each apparently a different Letter or combination of Letters ad-
dressing court procedure and delays.461  A number of chapters were republi-
cations of some of Robinson’s opinions, concurrences, and dissents.462 
Only some chapters of Robinson’s book deal with judicial values.  
Earlier in our chapter on The Robinson Court, we looked at many of his 
Letters on the Court’s work habits, efficiency, and performance, and on 
some of Robinson’s ideas for judicial reform.463  But his book also advo-
cated other judicial values. 
Robinson’s first chapter, entitled Key-Note,464 protested a number of 
perceived failings of the judicial system, and argued judges “have power to 
make rules and rulings to govern the court procedure and to put an end to 
all the delays, grafts and technicalities which continue to be a reproach to 
the law . . .”465  In this, Robinson was an early advocate of procedural 
reform by the courts themselves, without waiting indefinitely for legislative 
action. 
Eventually judicial reform of procedure took place.  The United States 
Supreme Court began it in the 1930s with new rules of civil procedure,466 
 
457. Id. 
458. Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Oct. 20, 1917, at 4 (“[W]hen the roses come 
again, then we shall publish a book of ‘Letters, Essays and Decisions.’”). 
459. ROBINSON, supra note 39. 
460. Id. 68-90. 
461. Id. 
462. See id. at 154 (reprinting Robinson’s dissent in Larson v. Russell, 176 N.W. 998, 1009 
(N.D. 1920)). 
463. See supra Part V. 
464. ROBINSON, supra note 39, at 74 (explaining his objectives in writing an opinion, 
Robinson told his readers what he meant by “Key-Note”: “The first half-dozen sentences should 
sound the keynote and fairly indicate the nature of the action and the defense.”) (italics in 
original). 
465. Id. at 4. 
466. See FED. C. JUD. P. AND R. at 25 (2004) (providing that the rules could be adopted and 
amended under a U.S. Supreme Court order on December 20, 1937, and pursuant to the Act of 
June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934)). 
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and the North Dakota Supreme Court adopted similar civil rules in 1957.467  
After new rules of civil procedure were embraced by nearly all states, refor-
mation by the courts progressed to new rules of criminal procedure, rules of 
evidence, rules of appellate procedure, and rules for judicial and lawyer 
conduct with co-ordinate disciplinary procedures.468  We think Robinson 
would be pleased by what has been accomplished, but would still not be 
satisfied that enough has been done to minimize litigation delay and 
expense. 
Although Robinson’s book followed Bruce’s, Robinson did not re-
spond to Bruce’s charges against him.  The main historical importance of 
Robinson’s book is the republication of many of his Letters, particularly his 
ideas for legal reforms.  Robinson encouraged enduring judicial values. 
Robinson stayed in Bismarck after he lost the election in 1922.469  In 
1931, he moved to a “national soldiers home” at Milwaukee, Wisconsin.470  
After “a long illness,” he died at the age of ninety on March 23, 1933.471 
The Bismarck Tribune quoted one of his Letters in a front-page story of 
Robinson’s death.  It expressed his favorite theme: 
Those who serve the public steal their time, soldier and neglect 
their duties . . . .  That is true of nearly all judges and even the nine 
judges of the United States supreme court (sic). 
Indeed the big nine are the chief sinners.  They take long vaca-
tions, continue in the ruts of ages and hold only biennial terms of 
court.  Instead of pushing their work and keeping their docket 
clean, like the North Dakota supreme court, they hold up most 
appeals for two or three years.  Of course that is not business.472 
This was a fitting memorial to Robinson’s campaign to improve his Court.  
Robinson was able to praise his own Court that had become a model to 
emulate in “pushing their work and keeping their docket clean.” 
Despite some shortcomings, North Dakota’s “Good Judge” had done a 
good job of shaping his own Court. 
 
467. Meschke & Smith, supra note 3, at 272. 
468. See, e.g., N.D. R. CIV. P. (2004-2005). 
469. James E. Robinson, Former Member of the High Court, Is Dead, BISMARCK TRIB., Mar. 
23, 1933, at 1. 
470. Id. 
471. Id. 
472. Id. 
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IX. ECHOES OF ROBINSON’S IDEAS 
Reflections of Robinson’s ideas about simplifying procedure, avoiding 
delay, and saving legal expense can be found in modern rules of procedure, 
as we have observed elsewhere in this article.473  Echoes of some of 
Robinson’s ideas on legal realism can be found in modern legal literature, 
even though his ideas are more often criticized than credited. 
In 1975, the Southern University Law Review published an article by 
Justice Albert Tate, Jr. of the Louisiana Supreme Court on The Justice 
Function of the Judge.474  He pondered the role of a judge in applying legal 
rules: “The adjudication in each case must result not only from an appli-
cation of legal rule but, also, in what the judge feels to be a result that is as 
fair as possible to the individual interests concerned.”475 
In the second part of his article, Justice Tate discussed what he called 
“judicial impressionism:” 
The performance of the justice function does not and should not 
involve judicial impressionism.  The judge is not to apply what is 
merely his subjective preference rather than some objective rule of 
law.  It would, of course, be unrealistic to assume that a judge’s 
personal philosophy does not consciously or unconsciously influ-
ence his choice of legal rule, or (at least as important) his per-
ception that a choice is available to him.476 
As a “dramatic illustration of unwonted excess of judicial impressionism, 
characterized by some of its critics as judicial anarchy,” Tate named French 
Judge Magnaud as described in Radin’s article.477  Although Tate does not 
name him, the American counterpart of the “Good Judge” was, as we 
discussed earlier, Justice Robinson.  Because Robinson largely failed to cite 
precedents in his opinions, he is thus identified as an example of “judicial 
impressionism.”478 
 
473. Notable examples include judicial rules of procedure, rather than legislative.  See supra 
Part IV (discussing Robinson’s Election); Part V.D. (discussing Reforming Rules); Part V.I. 
(discussing Robinson’s Results); and Part VIII (discussing Robinson’s book, Wrongs and 
Remedies: Economic Livewire Essays).  For summary opinions in clear cases, see Part VI.A. 
(discussing Central Law Journal: Bruce’s Attack).  For limiting the length of appellate briefs and 
oral arguments, see Part V.D. (discussing Reforming Rules) and Part VI.B. (Central Law Journal: 
Robinson’s Response). 
474. The Hon. Albert Tate, Jr., The Justice Function of the Judge, 1 S.U. L. REV. 250 (1975). 
475. Id. 
476. Id. at 253. 
477. Id. at 254, 254 n.6 (citing Max Radin, The Good Judge of Chateau-Thierry and His 
American Counterpart, 10 CAL. L. REV. 300 (1922)). 
478. Id. at 250. 
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Without digesting Tate’s entire article, we note he criticized “judicial 
impressionism,” but concluded his article with a sympathetic thought, 
writing that “[t]he justice function of the judge requires his fidelity 
primarily to the purpose of the law, not to its lettering divorced of social 
reason.”479  We think Robinson would have gladly agreed with this thought. 
In 1987 the Tulane Law Review, published In Memoriam: Honorable 
Albert Tate, Jr., by one of his former law clerks.480  Part of it discussed 
Justice Tate’s original article: 
In The Justice Function of a Judge [Tate] addressed himself more 
thoroughly and systematically than before to a search for the limits 
of judicial power.  As an alternative to ‘judicial impressionism’ 
Tate found in Llewellyn and in Geny what he regarded as a ser-
viceable definition of the ‘fairness’ a judge ought to require of the 
legal rules he chooses to fashion and/or enforce: the application of 
a rule should produce a result consistent with ‘the normally ex-
pectable result of the conduct or agreement or event in the society 
of the time.’481 
In a footnote to the phrase “judicial impressionism” in this passage, the 
author cited Tate’s article,482 and added: “Tate discusses, as an example of 
‘judicial impressionism,’ the so-called ‘good judge’ of Chateau-Th[i]erry 
who decided each case according to the needs or appealing qualities of the 
parties, with a corresponding loss of ‘doctrinal consistency’ and therefore of 
‘equality of treatment.’”483  Again, we note Radin designated Justice Robin-
son as the American counterpart of the “Good Judge” in his California Law 
Review article.484  Thus, Robinson has come to represent American “judi-
cial impressionism” in contemporary legal literature. 
In a 1985 article, Professor Dan-Cohen named Robinson in a long 
thesis on the theory of adjudication.485  The reference came in a footnote 
after this sentence in the concluding part of the article: “An attempt to 
practice any of the aspects of either of the models in its purity is likely to 
lead to a caricature of the judicial process.”486 
 
479. Id. at 265. 
480. Grover Joseph Rees, III, Albert Tate on the Judicial Function, 61 TUL. L. REV. 721 
(1987).  Rees was then Chief Justice, High Court of American Samoa. 
481. Id. at 737. 
482. Tate, supra note 474, at 250. 
483. Rees, supra note 480, at 737, 737 n.77. 
484. Radin, supra note 347, at 300. 
485. Meir Dan-Cohen, Bureaucratic Organizations and the Theory of Adjudication, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1985).  Dan-Cohen was on the faculty at Boalt Hall School of Law, University 
of California at Berkeley.  Id. 
486. Id. at 35. 
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The footnote said: “This was probably the experience of Justice 
Robinson, who claimed to disregard precedent completely and insisted on 
deciding each case on its merits.”487 
Robinson, more than any of his colleagues, was inclined to question a 
precedent he thought erroneous.  Still, the conclusion that he “claimed to 
disregard precedent completely” was an exaggeration. 
Robinson explained: “It is true that I have little regard for old, obsolete 
or erroneous decisions and prefer to decide every case in accordance with 
law, reason and justice.”488  Evidently the sweeping conclusion that 
Robinson ignored all precedent resulted from his habit of rarely citing spe-
cific precedents.  Still, as one of his national critics recognized: “Often his 
views are fully in accord with precedent—and [even] arbitrary technical 
precedent.”489 
In a l992 article about Professor Karl Llewellyn, Robinson was made 
the subject of a long footnote.490  In part II(3)(e) on Arts and Crafts: Law-
man’s Intuition and the Big Lie,491 while outlining Llewellyn’s German-
language publications, Ansaldi discussed Llewellyn’s ideas on how a judge 
must “choose whether to expand an old rule to cover the new case or refuse 
to expand it.”492  Ansaldi quoted a paragraph from Llewellyn about 
“guidelines” the judge has “learned to derive . . . .”493  The footnote about 
Robinson comes after this last sentence of the quoted Llewellyn paragraph, 
and reads “[t]he constraints and socialization resulting from his membership 
in society and from his legal training guarantee the continuity of decisions, 
the continuity of legal norms, and the predictability of the ‘freest’ decision 
making.”494  After giving the source of this quotation in footnote 136, 
Ansaldi undertook “to clear up a lingering mystery” about what Llewellyn 
said in an aside: “In all Europe I have heard of only one Bonjuge Maniou, 
and in my country of only one, on a high-court bench.”495 
In preparing his translation and analysis of Llewellyn’s German-
language texts, Ansaldi declared his inability “to locate any information” in 
 
487. Id. at 35, 35 n.112 (citing Andrew A. Bruce, Judicial Buncombe in North Dakota and 
Other States, 88 CENT. L.J. 136, 137 (1919); James E. Robinson, “Peculiarities” in the 
Administration of Justice in North Dakota—Justice Robinson’s Explanation, 88 CENT. L.J. 155, 
156 (1919); Rule and Discretion in the Administration of Justice, 33 HARV. L. REV. 972 (1920)) 
488. Robinson, supra note 208, at 156. 
489. Radin, supra note 347, at 307. 
490. Michael Ansaldi, The German Llewellyn, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 705 (1992). 
491. Id. at 740-745. 
492. Id. at 740. 
493. Id. at 741. 
494. Id. 
495. Id. at 741 n.136. 
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European legal literature about “‘Bonjuge Maniou’ or to identify 
[Llewellyn’s] allusion to his American homologue.”496 
Ansaldi concluded: 
[I]t now seems virtually certain that “Maniou” was just 
Llewellyn’s, or his German publisher’s, mistranscription of the 
nearly homophonous surname of the so-called “Bonjuge” 
Magnaud, a French jurist made famous by the account of his 
judicial and political careers in [a French book], and about whom 
Max Radin had also written.497 
Ansaldi cited Radin’s article in the California Law Review that we 
summarized earlier in this article.498 
In the footnote, Ansaldi summarized Radin’s description of Justice 
Robinson: 
Radin’s “American counterpart” to Magnaud, who was presum-
ably also Llewellyn’s member of a “high-court bench,” was one 
James E. Robinson, an adherent of the controversial agrarian-
socialist Non-Partisan League, elected in 1916 “by an unprece-
dented majority” to the North Dakota Supreme Court.  Radin de-
scribes him as “earnest; . . . immensely confident in [his] rectitude; 
[an] active politician . . . radical in [his] views and sympathies; 
who dislike[s] lawyers; and . . . ha[s] scant awe for [his] col-
leagues.”  He was “our Dakotan ‘bon judge’ . . . much moved by 
the recitals of plain, hardworking, simple people,” but also much 
given to “violent and picturesque” language, and far less consistent 
than his French counterpart in his rejection of the technicalities of 
statute or precedent.499 
Llewellyn’s indistinct references and Ansaldi’s clarifications put Robinson 
in the vanguard of American Legal Realism. 
In 1998, the Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 
published a long article, elaborately titled Chief Justice Traynor’s Contract 
Jurisprudence and the Free Law Dilemma: Nazism, The Judiciary, and 
California’s Contract Law, by Stephen J. Lubben.500  Lubben identified the 
international scholars in the Free Law Movement, including Eugene 
 
496. Id. 
497. Id. 
498. See supra Part VI.D. 
499. Ansaldi, supra note 490, at 742 n.136 (citations omitted). 
500. Stephen J. Lubben, Chief Justice Traynor’s Contract Jurisprudence and the Free Law 
Dilemma: Nazism, The Judiciary, and California’s Contract Law, 7 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 81 
(1998).  At the time, Lubben was a law clerk to Justice John T. Broderick, Jr., of the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court.  Id. 
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Ehrlich, “whose 1903 lecture . . . marks the first ‘pure’ Free Law document, 
[and who] was widely cited by Pound and Cardozo.”501  Another scholar, 
Hermann Kantorowicz, according to Lubben, “was read by key American 
Realists such as Max Radin and delivered a lecture in Karl Llewellyn’s 
seminar at Columbia University in 1934.”502 
In that paragraph, Lubben concluded that “the Free Law Movement 
was, in many ways, the intellectual forerunner of the Legal Realist move-
ment in this country.  Yet, it appears no American jurists or scholars direct-
ly adhered to the Free Law doctrine.”503  A footnote to the second sentence 
of this text included references to Robinson: 
See Kantorowicz, supra note 26, at 1241 (stating that Free Law 
“apparently has no adherents in this country”).  But see Note, Rule 
and Discretion in the Administration of Justice, 33 HARV. L. REV. 
972, 973 (1920) (detailing the career of Justice Robinson of the 
Supreme Court of North Dakota, who “expresses a preference for 
deciding ‘every case in accordance with law, reason and justice’”).  
For more on Justice Robinson, see Max Radin, Good Judge of 
Chateau-Thierry and His American Counterpart, 10 CAL. L. REV. 
300 (1922).504 
Thus, North Dakota’s “Good Judge,” Justice Robinson, gained lasting 
national attention as a principal in America’s Legal Realism movement. 
X. JUDICIAL VICES, VIRTUES, AND VALUES 
North Dakotans are apt to remember Robinson as sort of a buffoon on 
the bench.  Indeed, he was abrasive, eccentric, and opinionated. 
Robinson publicly scolded his colleagues for their indifference to the 
work, for the length and poor quality of their opinions and, often with his 
 
501. Id. at 89-90 (footnotes omitted) 
502. Id. at 90 (footnotes omitted). 
503. Id. at 90-91 (footnotes omitted). 
504. Id. at 91 n.48.  The second paragraph of the footnote may be of interest to some readers: 
G. Edward White has described the late Justice William O. Douglas as a jurist who 
was guided by a sense of justice and was unwilling to let a lack of precedents, statu-
tory law, or support from his brethren deter his march towards that goal.  White’s 
interpretation of Justice Douglas suggests the existence of an American Free Lawyer.  
On the other hand, it could be argued that Justice Douglas was a Realist whose 
position in the law allowed him the rare opportunity to move from describing the “is” 
to initiating the “ought.” 
Id. (citing G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 412-17 (2d. ed. 1988); 
HOWARD BALL & PHILLIP J. COOPER, OF POWER AND RIGHT: HUGO BLACK, WILLIAM O. 
DOUGLAS, AND AMERICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 278 (1992) (discussing Justice 
Douglas’ willingness to create rights in order to promote justice and Justice Black’s reticence to 
follow Douglas’ lead)) (internal citations omitted). 
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countless dissents, for the injustice of their decisions.505  He alienated the 
leadership of the League that put him on the Supreme Court.506 
Robinson’s eccentricities included unusual courtroom antics,507 pre-
mature publication of some of his opinions,508 and caustic public criticism 
of colleagues509—all things a dignified justice did not do.  He repeatedly 
raged against enforcement of laws prohibiting the sale of alcohol;510 
challenged a Sunday closing law that prevented him from buying a news-
paper on that day;511 and questioned some of the Non-Partisan League’s pet 
projects.512  Robinson usually had an opinion on any subject, and he 
generally publicized it. 
Despite his own vices, Robinson considered himself more virtuous than 
Bruce.  Robinson demonstrated, again and again, that Bruce was indifferent 
to the delays, expenses, and failings of his Court; indifferent to the adverse 
effect of his absences on the Court’s work; and indifferent to overstuffed 
opinions—all vices repugnant to Robinson.513 
On the other hand, Robinson’s record verifies a real and remarkable 
reformer, a true pathfinder for the judicial branch.514  He left a large legacy 
of valuable improvements, and he prophesied more reforms that eventually 
took place. 
 
505. See supra Part V. 
506. See supra text accompanying notes 412-15. 
507. Robinson sometimes walked out or turned his back on counsel at oral argument when 
he thought they had gone on too long.  See Meschke & Smith, supra note 3, at 247.  If Robinson 
left the courtroom during a two-day oral argument, he should be cheered, not jeered.  For exam-
ples of two-day oral arguments, see Saturday Evening Letters, BISMARCK TRIB., Mar. 11, 1918, at 
4; Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK TRIB., Apr. 13, 1918, at 4. 
508. See supra Part V.E. 
509. See supra Part V. 
510. See, e.g., Booze Knocks Flu Bug, Says J.E. Robinson: Octogenarian Jurist Renews His 
Vigorous Drive on State Bone Dry Lid, BISMARCK TRIB., Oct. 23, 1918, at 1; Langer Unfit to 
Hold High Legal Berth, BISMARCK TRIB., Oct. 30, 1918, at 1. “The consensus of opinion is that 
liquor is the most effective remedy, and to a great extent the prevailing sickness and deaths are 
due to the fact that liquor medicine cannot be obtained.” Saturday Evening Letter, BISMARCK 
TRIB., Nov. 9, 1918, at 4. 
511. See, e.g., Attorney General Outranked by High Court, BISMARCK TRIB., Jan. 8, 1917, at 
1.  The Bismarck Tribune discussed Robinson’s role in the controversy when Robinson declared 
“North Dakota’s Sunday closing statutes, a direct descendant of the old blue laws of the historic 
Massachusetts Bay colony, an outrage which should be tolerated by no free-born citizenry.”  Id.  
 Robinson “filed Bismarck’s first Sunday lid with [an] order” directing the Sheriff and Police 
to allow businesses to remain open on Sunday.  Id.  A few days later, the newsstand operator, who 
had sold him a Sunday paper on Robinson’s unilateral order, was arrested upon a warrant charging 
him with violating the Sunday closing law. 
See id.  See, e.g., N.G. Nelson who Tilted Sunday Lid at Robinson’s Request has been Arrested, 
BISMARCK TRIB., Jan. 11, 1917, at 3. 
512. See supra notes 445-449. 
513. See supra Part V. 
514. Id. 
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When Robinson took office, the Court was badly behind in its work 
and lacked a satisfactory system for doing it.  He confronted the backlog in 
every way he could with his own industrious and innovative efforts.  He 
advocated new rules to improve the Court’s efficiency.  He publicly pushed 
for more concerted efforts from his colleagues.  Robinson urged less talk, 
more work, and shorter opinions. 
After Bruce chose to leave, Robinson got results.515  Robinson per-
suaded his Court to change its rules in a number of ways he championed.516  
The Robinson Court became much more efficient and cleaned up its 
backlog. 
Many of Robinson’s ideas have endured.  They still guide much of the 
Court’s procedures. 
Cases are still scheduled for oral argument as soon as they are ready.517  
Printed briefs are not required, and the length of briefs is limited.518  The 
time for oral argument is limited to less than an hour a case without special 
permission.519  Every fifth case is automatically assigned to one justice to 
draft an initial opinion, so the work is equitably distributed among the five 
of them.520  Opinions are generally concise in the style Robinson recom-
mended, but they usually include citation to more relevant precedents than 
Robinson practiced.  His recommended form of summary decision for rou-
tine cases has been authorized by rule and is regularly used.521 
Eventually, over a third of a century after Robinson began preaching 
supervision of the trial courts in 1917, the North Dakota Supreme Court got 
around to actively doing it.522  Although the Robinson Court did little about 
it, today the North Dakota Supreme Court actively supervises all trial courts 
with detailed administrative and procedural rules and with management by 
a Court Administrator.523  As Robinson foresaw, this modern system makes 
application and enforcement of the laws as uniform as possible throughout 
the state.524  Robinson would applaud. 
 
515. See supra Part V.I. 
516. Id. 
517. See N.D. R. APP. P. 45, 45 Explanatory Note. 
518. See N.D. R. APP. P. 32, 28(g). 
519. See N.D. R. APP. P. 34(b). 
520. No rule formalizes this fixed tradition, but it is carefully adhered to by the Clerk in 
assigning cases. 
521. N.D. R. APP. P. 35.1. 
522. See Meschke & Smith, supra note 3, at 270. 
523. See N.D. ADMIN. R. 1 (providing for a state court administrator and explaining powers, 
duties and qualifications).  See generally N.D. ADMIN. R. 1-46. 
524. See Meschke & Smith, supra note 3, at 267-290. 
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Robinson planted important seeds for this modernization.  The his-
torical record reflects that Robinson influenced enactment of the 1919 
statute that authorized the Supreme Court to make rules of pleading, prac-
tice and procedure.525  More than four decades after Robinson, Justice 
Ralph J. Erickstad, during his three decades on the Court from 1963 
through 1992, cultivated and fertilized Robinson’s reforms that enabled the 
modernization of the judicial system in North Dakota, largely through 
rulemaking.526 
Even in substantive law, Robinson’s brand of Legal Realism continues 
to provoke legal scholars to examine the role of discretion in decision-
making.527  Indeed, since Robinson’s efforts, reviewing courts have ac-
corded trial courts considerably more discretion.528 
History thus confirms Robinson as a more noteworthy judicial figure 
than North Dakotans have understood.  While he gained national attention 
for his early stance on Legal Realism, much of that attention has been 
negative for his visible lack of deference to precedent.529  However, legal 
scholars have otherwise overlooked his significant achievements and 
leadership in judicial reforms.  We believe Robinson deserves more respect 
as a medium of major reform of a dysfunctional bench.  He endowed his 
court with a large legacy of efficient procedures. 
Judicial values, however, may well inherit more than efficient 
procedures and some measure of Legal Realism from the Robinson experi-
ence.  Robinson’s outspokenness as a judge, with public positions on many 
subjects, reflected a judicial freedom that prophesied the United States 
Supreme Court’s application of the First Amendment to judicial speech in 
White.530 
In Robinson’s time, no formal prior restraints on judicial speech 
existed.531  Written rules of judicial conduct began shortly after North 
Dakota’s experience with Robinson’s outspokenness and Bruce’s criticism 
 
525. See 1919 N.D. Laws 284 ch. 167, § 6 (codified as amended at N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-
02-08 (2004). 
526. Meschke & Smith, supra note 3, at 296-301. 
527. See supra Part IX. 
528. For a few illustrations, consider the widely used “abuse of discretion” standard 
employed in reviewing procedural decisions.  City of Medora v. Goldberg, 1997 ND 190, ¶ 13, 
569 N.W.2d 257 (discussing whether a taking was necessary for a public use); State v. Neufeld, 
1998 ND 103, ¶¶ 13-14, 578 N.W.2d 536 (examining joinder of criminal charges for trial); Tank 
v. Tank, 2004 ND 15, ¶ 45, 673 N.W.2d 622 (analyzing motions to alter or amend divorce 
judgments and interim orders for temporary custody) (Maring, J., dissenting). 
529. See supra Part IX. 
530.  Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
531. See id. at 786 (“The first code regulating judicial conduct was adopted by the A.B.A. in 
1924.”). 
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of it as unseemly.532  In the next eight decades, the judicial system devel-
oped regulations to control the speech of judges and judicial candidates.533 
Now we are returning to unrestrained judicial speech.534  In this, too, 
Robinson was ahead of his time. 
The White decision has abruptly brought us nearly full circle, to 
virtually unrestrained speech by candidates for judicial office.535  To be 
sure, White did not directly decide the validity of prior restraints on 
“pledges and promises” by judicial candidates.536  Still, White lifted re-
straints on judicial candidates expressing their views on virtually any 
subject, short of promising specific action in a particular case.537  As the  
dissents in White explained, candidates will be able to express their views 
adroitly enough to avoid judicial discipline, just as Birdzell and Grace 
apparently did in 1916.  We have turned back the clock to Robinson’s time 
in free speech for judges. 
Yet, decisions since White reflect many different views about what 
judicial campaign activities and speech can be regulated by the judicial 
branch or legislature.  Good examples are the diverse panel opinions pro-
posed on remand to the Eighth Circuit in Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White.538 
Two panel members concluded White required a “remand to the district 
court for entry of judgment in favor of Wersal and the other plaintiffs on 
their ‘announce’ clause claim.”539  But the panel majority also would have 
remanded for “the district court to receive new evidence and to determine 
whether the partisan activity clauses can survive strict scrutiny in light of 
the Supreme Court’s opinion.”540  Third, the panel majority concluded the 
 
532. Meschke & Smith, supra note 3, at 268-76. 
533. White, 236 U.S. at 765. 
534. Id. 
535. Id. at 770. 
536. Id. 
537. Id. at 819-20 (Ginsberg, J.,  dissenting) 
538. 361 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated, 361 F.3d 1035 (8th Cir. 2004). En banc 
decision on remand, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005).  The majority held that, in addition to the an-
nounce clause, rules prohibiting partisan activities and solicitation of funds by judicial candidates 
were unconstitutional and violated the First Amendment.  They remanded for entry of summary 
judgment.  But the holding was far from unanimous.  Three of the thirteen-judge panel concurred 
in the judgment, but only in part of the reasoning.  Three judges joined in a dissent; they would 
have remanded for a trial on the personal activity and solicitation prohibitions.  One judge con-
curred in remanding for summary judgment on the partisan activity clause, but joined the dissents 
on the solicitation clause.  The uncertainties continue. 
539. White, 361 F.3d at 1039. 
540. Id. at 1048. 
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regulatory defendants would be entitled to summary judgment upholding a 
rule against a candidate personally soliciting campaign funds.541 
The third member of the panel, Judge Beam, agreed the plaintiffs ought 
to have summary judgment declaring the “announce” clause unconstitu-
tional.542  Judge Beam dissented, however, because he believed “the plain-
tiffs [were] also entitled to judgment on their ‘partisan activities’ and 
‘personal solicitation’ claims.”543 
But the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, vacated the panel judgment and 
granted rehearing en banc in May 2004.544  This may indicate even more 
divergence of views.  Other decisions since White differ on its effect.545  For 
example, in Griffen v. The Arkansas Discipline and Disability Commis-
sion,546 a four-justice majority quashed an admonishment of a black judge 
who had met with the informal “Black Caucus” of the Arkansas legislature 
to discuss the firing of a black coach at a state university.547  The majority 
concluded a canon prohibiting a judge from “appear[ing] at a public hearing 
before, or otherwise consult with, a[] . . . legislative body or official . . . 
except when acting pro se in a matter involving the judge or the judge’s 
interests,” was not sufficiently narrow to pass strict scrutiny under the First 
Amendment.548  Three justices wrote separate dissents, each joined by the 
other two.549 
As we neared completion of this article, Judge Daniel L. Hovland, 
Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of North 
Dakota, issued a significant opinion on March 21, 2005, in North Dakota 
Family Alliance v. Bader.550 
 
541. Id. at 1039, 1048-49. 
542. Id. at 1049. 
543. Id. (Beam, J., dissenting) 
544. Id. at 1035. 
545. Compare Spargo v. New York State Comm’n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72 
(N.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated for abstention, 351 F.3d 65 (C.A. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2812 
(2004) (invalidating restrictions on political activity by judicial candidates), with In re Raab, 793 
N.E.2d 1287 (N.Y. 2003) (upholding New York restrictions on political activity by judicial 
candidates as narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests); In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1 
(N.Y. 2003) (discussing a New York rule prohibiting judicial candidates from making pledges or 
promises upheld under strict scrutiny).  Compare In re Dunleavey, 838 A.2d 338 (Me. 2003), cert. 
denied, 124 S. Ct. 1722 (2004) (upholding Maine restriction on a judge’s solicitation of support 
for political candidates as narrowly tailored) with Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 
2002) (invalidating Georgia canon prohibiting judicial candidates personally soliciting campaign 
contributions and declaring judicial campaign speech protected like campaign speech for other 
elective offices). 
 546. 130 S.W.3d 524 (2003). 
547. Griffen, 130 S.W.3d 524 (2003). 
548. Id. at 528, 538. 
549. Id. at 539, 544, 547. 
550. N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (D.N.D. 2005). 
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Judge Hovland concluded the “pledges and promises” clause and the 
“commitment” clause in the North Dakota Code of Judicial Conduct “es-
sentially prohibit the same type of constitutionally-protected speech” as in 
White,551 and summarily declared them unconstitutional.552 
However, in the same opinion, Judge Hovland rejected a constitutional 
challenge to the disqualification rule in the North Dakota Code of Judicial 
Conduct, Canon 3E(1).553  That rule requires a judge to disqualify himself 
whenever “the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . .”554  
Judge Hovland reasoned that the “recusal provisions in Canon 3E(1) serve 
the state’s interest in impartiality and the canon is narrowly drafted to 
achieve that interest.”555 
Similarly, editorial opinions have varied on what to do.  Some advocate 
moving to an appointive system of selecting judges.556  Others seek to retain 
an elective system with such changes as may be necessary following 
White.557  Some merely ponder the problem: “some adjustments in the 
system might be valuable . . . .”558 
In this uncertain context,559 North Dakota’s experience with Robin-
son’s forceful speech shows how difficult it will be to design any effective 
 
551. Id. at 1021. 
552. Id. 
553. Id. at 20-21. 
554. N.D. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 3E(1). 
555. N.D. Family Alliance, 361 F. Supp. 2d at 1021. 
556. Editorial, Politicized Elections for Judges Must be Avoided, ROCHESTER POST-
BULLETIN (Rochester, Minn), Aug. 6, 2003, at 9 (“If the U.S. Supreme Court rules that a 
significant change must be made, the state should move to an appointive system . . .”). 
557. See Editorial, Choosing Judges: What’s the Best Way to Do It?,  STAR TRIB. (Minn.), 
August 11, 2003, at A14 (“Don’t tinker with Minnesota’s system of picking judges”). 
558. Id.  According to a Star Tribune story, dated September 17, 2004, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court declined to adopt recommended changes to their judicial conduct rules, saying “Any 
changes relating to partisan political activity should wait for a period between elections.” 
http//www.startribune.com/stories/462/4985643.html. 
559. The American Bar Association has tried to remodel its Model Code of Judicial Conduct.  
“In 1990, the ABA Model Code replaced the ‘announce’ clause with [a] ‘commit’ clause [to] 
prohibit a judicial candidate from mak[ing] statements that commit or appear to commit the 
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court.”  
ABA ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 5A(3)(d) (2004).  After the White 
decision invalidated the “announce” clause, a Working Group on the First Amendment and 
Judicial Campaigns (created in 2001 by the ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Independence) 
recommended several changes in the Model Code.  Id. at 356-357. 
 The ABA Working Group recommended expanding and modifying the “pledges or promises” 
clause.  They combined parts of the “commit” clause with the “pledges or promises” clause and 
they modified language that restricts statements that commit a judicial candidate to protect a com-
pelling interest in the maintenance of judicial impartiality, integrity and independence.  See id. 
(containing the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Judicial Independence and the 
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Report 105B to the House of 
Delegates (2003)).  The amendments to Canon 5A(d)(3) were adopted by the A.B.A. House of 
Delegates in August 2003.  See id. at 357-358. 
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prior restraints on judicial expression.  Instead, we believe, the judicial 
branch should concentrate on refining the standards and procedures for as-
signing and disqualifying judges for specific cases and classes of cases. 
Presently, the North Dakota Code of Judicial Conduct, the adminis-
trative rules, and the statutes on judicial administration largely leave dis-
qualification to voluntary action by the individual judge.560  No mechanism 
exists to impose an involuntary disqualification on a judge, even when 
needed to assure the appearance of impartiality and the judge refuses to 
voluntarily step aside, at or after assignment.  Only post-conduct discipline 
for egregious conduct is contemplated.561 
Judicial regulation will not be able to prevent a judge or judicial 
candidate from speaking out on any subject.  Presumptively, prior restraints 
on judicial campaign expression are unlikely to work.562 
Surely, the court system itself controls its internal processes for assign-
ing and reassigning judges to cases.  The judicial system retains the power 
to remove a judge from sitting on a pending case, before the need to impose 
discipline arises.  An overly expressive judge certainly has no constitutional 
right to sit on any particular case if his prior public remarks suggest his 
impartiality is questionable.  An independent process ought to determine his 
assignment or disqualification. 
Moving in this direction, a better system of case management needs to 
be developed to minimize any appearance of bias or partiality.  This will 
undoubtedly require more elaborate controls and procedures for assignment 
and reassignment of cases than exists now. 
More categorical standards, on what speech will disqualify a judicial 
person from what cases, may have to be written.  And, some improved 
intermediate-review mechanisms may be needed to correct assignments 
after a potential bias is suggested on the record.  Leaving the disqualifica-
tion to voluntary action of the sitting judge seems unlikely to prove 
satisfactory in preserving impartiality. 
 
560. Compare N.D. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (2004-2005) Canon 3E(1) (“A judge shall 
disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned . . . .”) with N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-23-03 (2005) (authorizing the Judicial Conduct 
Commission to recommend the censure, transfer to disability status, or involuntarily retire a judge 
for egregious misconduct).  See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-15-21 (2005) (authorizing an 
involuntary change of judge upon a timely demand by a party). 
561. See supra note 560. 
562. “Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy 
presumption against its constitutional validity.”  Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 
(1963).  The North Dakota Constitution declares: “Every man may freely write, speak and publish 
his opinions on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege ”  N.D. CONST. art. I, 
§ 4. 
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Of course, designing this kind of process will not be easy.  But then, 
fabricating our modern system of rules has not been easy, either.  Rule-
making is an ongoing process that builds on experience. 
To begin, North Dakota’s experience with Robinson should come in 
handy.  For example, a premature opinion about a case should automatically 
disqualify the judge from that case and others like it. 
Enough judicial work exists to obviate damage to the system by barring 
a judge from sitting on a class of cases after the judge’s public remarks on 
the subject.  It would be similar to the de facto disqualification for criminal 
trials, for a time, that has often been practiced by a prosecutor or criminal 
defense lawyer who has become a judge.  Except in the most isolated rural 
places, there is plenty of judicial work to do, so that a judge disqualified in 
one or more categories should not unduly unbalance the judicial workloads.  
And if a judge thinks he can artfully reduce his own workload by selec-
tively speaking out, the judge could be disciplined and other judges and 
candidates will be free to speak out against his re-election for deliberately 
shirking his responsibilities. 
Those today that are keen in speaking out during judicial campaigns 
would do well to keep the Robinson experience in mind.  His opinionated 
outspokenness may have helped elect him to one term, but he was deci-
sively defeated for re-election despite his diligence and efforts to improve 
the system. 
Bruce’s characterization of Robinson has obscured Robinson’s remark-
able reforms and achievements.  Bruce pinned Robinson with a bad reputa-
tion for unethical conduct by his vigorous attacks on Robinson’s premature 
opinions.  Bruce insisted that a judge’s political activities and speech were 
inimical to the need for judicial impartiality.  Bruce’s views gained general 
acceptance and became merged into most standards of judicial conduct 
written as prior restraints.  But, no longer. 
Now, the judicial branch must “go back to the future.”  It must 
strengthen standards of impartiality.  Rather than imposing prior restraints 
on judicial speech, the courts must attach specific post-speech 
consequences on judges who talk too much, instead of barring their way to 
office. 
The appearance of impartiality remains an important judicial value.  
Improved and independent disqualification procedures can preserve it better 
than prior restraints. 
Despite his vices, Justice James E. Robinson should be favorably 
remembered as North Dakota’s “Good Judge” for the valuable 
improvements he contributed to the North Dakota judicial system. 
